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Issues Involved:
1. Constitutionality of the Rewa State Pre-emption Act, 1949. 2. Applicability of the doctrine of approbate and reprobate. 3. Right to appeal after accepting benefits under a decree. Detailed Analysis: 1. Constitutionality of the Rewa State Pre-emption Act, 1949: The main point in the appeal is whether the Rewa State Pre-emption Act, 1949, is unconstitutional on the ground that it places an unreasonable restriction upon the right to acquire property enumerated in cl. (1)(f) of Art. 19 of the Constitution. This issue was not addressed directly in the preliminary hearing and was set aside for the main hearing on merits. 2. Applicability of the Doctrine of Approbate and Reprobate: The preliminary objection raised by the respondent was based on the doctrine that a person cannot be allowed to approbate and reprobate, which means one cannot accept and reject the same instrument. The appellant had withdrawn the pre-emption price deposited by the respondent, which, according to the respondent, amounted to accepting the decree and thus precluded the appellant from challenging it. The court examined several cases, including Tinkler v. Hilder, and concluded that the principle underlying these decisions is that a person cannot adopt one part of an order and repudiate another if the order is intended to take effect in its entirety. 3. Right to Appeal After Accepting Benefits Under a Decree: The court found that the appellant did not seek to execute the decree, and the act of withdrawing the pre-emption price was not tantamount to adopting the decree. The price of pre-emption was characterized as compensation rather than a benefit under the decree. The court referred to various cases, including Lissenden v. C. A. V. Bosch, Ltd., and concluded that a statutory right of appeal cannot be presumed to have come to an end because the appellant has abided by or taken advantage of something done by the opponent under the decree. The court held that the appellant's act in withdrawing the pre-emption price did not preclude him from continuing his appeal. Separate Judgment by Sarkar, J.: Sarkar, J. dissented, holding that the objection to the maintainability of the appeal must succeed. According to him, the appellant, having taken the benefit of the decree by withdrawing the pre-emption price, cannot now challenge its validity. He emphasized that the appellant's conduct in withdrawing the money was entirely voluntary and that such conduct precluded him from challenging the decree. Sarkar, J. referred to several cases, including Tinkler v. Hilder and Evans v. Bartlam, to support his view that a litigant cannot pursue inconsistent courses of conduct. Conclusion: The majority judgment overruled the preliminary objection, allowing the appeal to be set down for hearing on merits. The costs of the hearing were to be costs in the appeal. Sarkar, J. dissented, arguing that the appeal should be dismissed due to the appellant's acceptance of the decree's benefits.
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