2007 (7) TMI 629 - SC - Indian Laws

Whether meaning of word made occurring in sub-section (4) of Section 126 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 has to be taken as a date of passing the order or the date when it was communicated to the party concerned?

Issues Involved:
1. Interpretation of the word 'made' in sub-section (4) of Section 126 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957.
2. Limitation period for making amendments to the assessment list under Section 126 of the Act.
3. Requirement of communication of the assessment order to the assessee within the limitation period.

Issue-Wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Interpretation of the word 'made' in sub-section (4) of Section 126 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957:
The primary issue in this case was the interpretation of the word 'made' as it appears in sub-section (4) of Section 126 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957. The Supreme Court had to determine whether 'made' referred to the date when the assessment order was signed or when it was communicated to the assessee. The Division Bench of the Delhi High Court had opined that 'made' should be interpreted as the date when the order was communicated to the assessee, but the Supreme Court disagreed, holding that 'made' should be understood as the date when the order was signed.

2. Limitation period for making amendments to the assessment list under Section 126 of the Act:
The limitation period for making amendments to the assessment list was another critical issue. According to sub-section (4) of Section 126, no amendment shall be made after the expiry of three years from the end of the year in which the notice is given. The respondents argued that the assessment order was time-barred as it was not communicated within the three-year period. However, the Supreme Court clarified that the limitation period is satisfied if the order is signed within the stipulated time, regardless of when it is communicated.

3. Requirement of communication of the assessment order to the assessee within the limitation period:
The necessity of communicating the assessment order to the assessee within the limitation period was contested. The respondents contended that for the order to be valid, it must be communicated within the three-year period. The Supreme Court, however, held that while communication is necessary for the assessee to exercise the right of appeal, it is not required for the order to be 'made' within the meaning of the Act. The Court emphasized that the statutory requirement is met once the order is signed and entered into the official records.

Comprehensive Summary:

The Supreme Court, in this judgment, addressed the interpretation of the word 'made' in sub-section (4) of Section 126 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957. The case arose from a dispute over the assessment of property taxes, where the respondents challenged the assessment on the grounds of being time-barred. The Division Bench of the Delhi High Court had previously ruled that the term 'made' should be interpreted as the date when the assessment order was communicated to the assessee. However, the Supreme Court overturned this decision, holding that 'made' refers to the date when the order is signed.

The Court analyzed various statutory provisions and precedents to conclude that the legislative intent was to restrict the period within which the Commissioner could amend the assessment list, not to mandate communication within that period. The Court emphasized that an order is considered 'made' when it is signed and entered into the official records, not when it is communicated to the assessee. This interpretation aligns with the statutory purpose of preventing abuse of power by the Commissioner while ensuring that the limitation period is strictly adhered to.

The Supreme Court further clarified that while communication is necessary for the assessee to appeal the order, it is not a prerequisite for the order to be validly 'made' within the meaning of the Act. The Court underscored the presumption that statutory authorities act bona fide and in regular course of business, and there is no need to infer misuse of power without concrete evidence.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court and restored the decision of the learned Single Judge, thereby allowing the appeal. The Court's interpretation ensures that the limitation period is respected while maintaining the integrity of the statutory process.

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