9911796707
|
Home
Issues Involved:
1. Limitation period for filing an application under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. 2. Interpretation of "the date of the Collector's award" under the proviso to Section 18. 3. Requirement of communication of the award to the affected party. Detailed Analysis: 1. Limitation Period for Filing an Application under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894: The primary issue in this case is whether the application filed by the appellant under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, was within the prescribed limitation period. The appellant contended that his application was timely because he was not informed about the award until January 13, 1953, and he filed the application on February 24, 1953. The respondents argued that the application was beyond the six-month period from the date of the award, which was March 25, 1951. 2. Interpretation of "the date of the Collector's award" under the Proviso to Section 18: The court had to determine whether "the date of the Collector's award" should be interpreted literally as the date the award was signed and filed by the Collector or if it should include the date when the award was communicated to the affected party. The court noted that a literal interpretation would result in unfair consequences, as parties unaware of the award would lose their right to challenge it. The court emphasized that the award is essentially an offer made by the Collector on behalf of the government, and for it to be effective, it must be communicated to the affected party. Thus, the "date of the award" should be construed as the date when the award is either actually or constructively known to the party concerned. 3. Requirement of Communication of the Award to the Affected Party: The court highlighted the mandatory nature of Section 12(2) of the Act, which requires the Collector to give immediate notice of the award to persons not present when the award is made. This requirement underscores the necessity of communication for the award to be effective. The court reasoned that the legislative intent was to ensure that affected parties are informed of the award to enable them to exercise their right to challenge it within the prescribed limitation period. The court referred to several judicial decisions supporting the view that the limitation period should commence from the date of communication of the award to the affected party. For instance, in Magdonald v. The Secretary of State for India in Council, it was held that an award cannot be considered legally made until it is communicated to the parties concerned. The court also discussed the inconsistency in judicial interpretations, noting that some decisions, like Jehangir Bomanji v. G. D. Gaikwad, incorrectly construed the limitation period without considering the necessity of communication. The court preferred the reasoning in cases like O.A.O.A.M. Muthia Chettiar v. The Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras, which held that limitation should not start until the party knows or should have known about the order. Conclusion: The Supreme Court concluded that the application filed by the appellant was within the limitation period, as the limitation should be computed from the date the award was communicated to him. The court allowed the appeal, set aside the orders of the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court, and restored the order of Mehrotra, J., directing the respondent to consider the appellant's application on its merits. The appeal was allowed without any order as to costs.
|
