9911796707
|
Home
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of judgment delivery after the death of one of the judges. 2. Interpretation of the terms "pronounced" and "delivered" in the context of judgment. 3. Inherent jurisdiction of courts to rectify defects caused by accidents such as death. 4. Distinction between a draft judgment and a final judgment. 5. Public policy considerations regarding judgment delivery. Detailed Analysis: 1. Validity of Judgment Delivery After the Death of One of the Judges: The primary issue is whether a judgment can be validly delivered after the death of one of the judges who heard the appeal. In this case, Bhargava J. had signed the judgment but died before it was delivered. Kidwai J. subsequently delivered the judgment as if Bhargava J. was still alive. The court concluded that the judgment delivered by Kidwai J. on 5th January, 1953, was not valid because Bhargava J. had died before it could be delivered. The appeal was allowed, and the case was sent back to the High Court for rehearing and delivery of a proper judgment. 2. Interpretation of the Terms "Pronounced" and "Delivered": The court examined the use of the terms "pronounced" and "delivered" in the rules of the Allahabad High Court. It was argued that a judgment must be both pronounced and delivered, and that these terms signify different actions. The court, however, did not construe these rules too technically, emphasizing that they are designed to further the ends of justice and should not be viewed too narrowly. The essence of a judgment is its formal intimation to the parties and the world at large in open court. 3. Inherent Jurisdiction of Courts to Rectify Defects: The court recognized the inherent jurisdiction of courts to rectify defects caused by accidents such as the death of a judge. This principle was supported by a Judicial Committee decision in Firm Gokal Chand v. Firm Nand Ram, where it was held that the court must have the inherent jurisdiction to supply defects caused by such accidents. However, the court distinguished this case from the present one, noting that in the former case, the judgment was delivered in open court with both judges present, whereas in the present case, the judgment was not delivered before the judge's death. 4. Distinction Between a Draft Judgment and a Final Judgment: The court emphasized that a draft judgment, even if signed, is not the final judgment until it is formally delivered in open court. Judges may discuss and exchange drafts, but these are not judgments until they are formally declared in open court. The final operative act is the formal delivery of the judgment, which crystallizes it into a full-fledged judgment. The judge must be alive and in a position to change his mind up to the moment of delivery. 5. Public Policy Considerations: Public policy considerations play a significant role in the delivery of judgments. It is against public policy to leave the door open for investigations into whether a draft judgment was intended to embody the judge's final opinion or was only a tentative draft. The court cited the Full Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court in Mahomed Akil v. Asadunnissa Bibee, which held that judgments must be delivered and pronounced in open court and that judges who have died or retired cannot join in the judgment. Conclusion: The judgment delivered by Kidwai J. on 5th January, 1953, was invalid because Bhargava J. had died before it could be delivered. The appeal was allowed, and the case was sent back to the High Court for rehearing and delivery of a proper judgment. The death sentence could not be carried out as there was no valid decision of the appeal and no valid confirmation. The second and third appellants were required to surrender to their bail, reverting to their position at the time of the appeal to the High Court.
|
