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Issues Involved:
1. Applicability of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 to the industrial establishments of the State Electricity Board. 2. Continuation of Standing Orders after the purchase of an undertaking by the Board or the framing of regulations under Section 79(c) of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. 3. Applicability of Section 13-B of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 to industrial establishments other than those of the government. Issue-wise Detailed Analysis: 1. Applicability of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 to the industrial establishments of the State Electricity Board: The Full Bench of the High Court held that the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 applies to the industrial establishments of the State Electricity Board. This was not contested by the appellant in the Supreme Court. The Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act is a special act designed to define and secure reasonable conditions of service for workmen in industrial establishments employing one hundred or more workmen. It mandates employers to make Standing Orders and get them certified by a quasi-judicial authority. The Supreme Court affirmed this view, emphasizing that the Act is specially designed to define the terms of employment of workmen in industrial establishments and to give them a collective voice in defining these terms. 2. Continuation of Standing Orders after the purchase of an undertaking by the Board or the framing of regulations under Section 79(c) of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948: The Full Bench held that the Standing Orders framed for an industrial establishment by an electrical undertaking do not cease to be operative on the purchase of the undertaking by the Board or the framing of regulations under Section 79(c) of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. The Supreme Court agreed with this view, stating that the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, being a special act dealing with the specific subject of conditions of service of workmen in industrial establishments, prevails over the general provisions of the Electricity (Supply) Act. The Court emphasized that the general rule "Generalia specialibus non derogant" (general provisions do not derogate from special provisions) applies here, meaning that the specific provisions of the Standing Orders Act take precedence over the general provisions of the Electricity (Supply) Act. 3. Applicability of Section 13-B of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 to industrial establishments other than those of the government: The Full Bench held that Section 13-B of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 applies only to the industrial establishments of the government and not to other establishments. The Supreme Court disagreed with this interpretation. Section 13-B states that the Act does not apply to industrial establishments where the workmen are governed by specific rules or regulations notified by the appropriate government. The Supreme Court clarified that the expression "any other rules or regulations" in Section 13-B should not be narrowly construed to mean only government servants. The Court held that the regulation made by the U.P. State Electricity Board regarding the age of superannuation, having been duly notified by the government, is valid and applicable. The Court concluded that the respondents were properly retired upon attaining the age of 58 years as per the notified regulation. Conclusion: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act is a special law regarding the conditions of service enumerated in the schedule, and the regulations made by the Electricity Board with respect to any of those matters are of no effect unless notified by the government under Section 13-B or certified by the Certifying Officer under Section 5 of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act. The regulation regarding the age of superannuation made by the Board and notified by the government was held to be valid, and the respondents were properly retired at the age of 58 years. The writ petition filed in the High Court was dismissed, and the appellants were awarded costs of Rs. 3,500/- to be paid to the respondents.
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