2003 (9) TMI 778 - SC - Indian Laws

Whether as the accident had taken place on 18.2.1989 and the claim petition was filed on 2.11.1995; when the claim was barred under the old Motor Vehicles Act,t, the same could not have been revived under the new Motor Vehicles Act?

Summary

Issues:
1. Interpretation of changes in the Motor Vehicles Act regarding the limitation period for filing claim petitions.
2. Applicability of Section 6A of the General Clauses Act in the context of the deletion of sub-section (3) of Section 166.
3. Invocation of Article 137 of the Limitation Act in the absence of a prescribed limitation period in the Motor Vehicles Act.

Analysis:

1. The primary issue in this case revolves around the interpretation of changes in the Motor Vehicles Act concerning the limitation period for filing claim petitions. The appellant contended that since the accident occurred before the enactment of the new Act, the claim petition filed after the old Act's limitation period should not have been entertained. However, the Supreme Court highlighted the significant amendment brought about by Act 53 of 1994, which omitted the limitation period for filing claim petitions. The Court emphasized that this change aimed to prevent injustice to accident victims and their families, allowing claims to be filed without being time-barred. The Court relied on the precedent set in Dhannalal's case to support the view that the deletion of the limitation period provision necessitated the Tribunal to entertain the claim petition without considering the accident date.

2. Regarding the applicability of Section 6A of the General Clauses Act, the appellant argued that the deletion of sub-section (3) of Section 166 should not affect the continuance of the old Act's provisions. However, the Court rejected this argument, emphasizing that the intention behind the deletion was to prevent injustice caused by strict limitation periods. The Court held that the different intention for the deletion of the provision negated the application of Section 6A of the General Clauses Act. The Court reinforced its stance by citing the rationale provided in Dhannalal's case, which supported the deletion of the limitation period provision.

3. The final issue addressed was the invocation of Article 137 of the Limitation Act in the absence of a specified limitation period in the Motor Vehicles Act. The appellant suggested using Article 137 to prevent stale claims and avoid multiple litigations. However, the Court disagreed, stating that the Motor Vehicles Act was designed as a beneficial legislation to provide timely relief to accident victims and their families. The Court highlighted that the deliberate deletion of the limitation period provision by the legislature aimed to offer effective relief without being hindered by technicalities like limitation periods. Therefore, the Court dismissed the appeal, emphasizing that invoking Article 137 would contradict the legislative intent and defeat the purpose of providing swift relief to victims of motor accidents.