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2019 (11) TMI 349 - SC - Indian LawsJurisdiction to handle Road traffic offences - Whether the Gauhati High Court was justified in issuing directions that road traffic offences shall be dealt with only under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (MV Act), and in holding that in cases of road traffic or motor vehicle offences, prosecution under the provisions of Indian Penal Code,1860 (IPC) is without sanction of law, and recourse to the provisions of the IPC would be unsustainable in law? HELD THAT - There is no conflict between the provisions of the IPC and the MV Act. Both the statutes operate in entirely different spheres. The offences provided under both the statutes are separate and distinct from each other. The penal consequences provided under both the statutes are also independent and distinct from each other - The ingredients of offences under the both statutes, are different, and an offender can be tried and punished independently under both statutes. The principle that the special law should prevail over the general law, has no application in cases of prosecution of offenders in road accidents under the IPC and M.V. Act. It is pertinent to mention that there is no provision under the M.V. Act which separately deals with offences causing death, or grievous hurt, or hurt by a motor vehicle in cases of motor vehicle accidents. Chapter XIII of the M.V. Act is silent about the act of rash and negligent driving resulting in death, or hurt, or grievous hurt, to persons nor does it prescribe any separate punishment for the same; whereas Sections 279, 304 Part II, 304A, 337 and 338 of the IPC have been specifically framed to deal with such offences - It is well settled that an act or an omission can constitute an offence under the IPC and at the same time, be an offence under any other law. The finding of the High Court that the prosecution of offenders under two statutes i.e. the M.V. Act and the IPC, is unsustainable and contrary to law, is therefore, set aside. A similar issue arose in the case of TS BALIAH VERSUS TS RANGACHARI, INCOME-TAX OFFICER, CENTRAL CIRCLE VI, MADRAS 1968 (12) TMI 1 - SUPREME COURT , wherein the appellant was prosecuted both under Section 177 of the IPC, and Section 52 of the Income Tax Act, 1922. This Court held that the section provides that where an act or omission constitutes an offence under two enactments, the offender may be prosecuted and punished under either or both the enactments but shall not be liable to be punished twice for the same offence. Similarly, in THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA VERSUS SAYYED HASSAN SAYYED SUBHAN ORS. 2018 (9) TMI 1803 - SUPREME COURT , the accused was prosecuted under Sections 26 and 30 of the Food and Safety Standards Act, 2006 as well as Sections 188, 272, 273 and 328 of the IPC for transportation and sale of prohibited gutka/pan masala. The High Court held that Section 55 of the Food and Safety Standards Act, 2006 being a specific provision made in a special enactment, Section 188 of the IPC was inapplicable. Thus, the legislative intent of the MV Act, and in particular Chapter XIII of the MV Act, was not to override or supersede the provisions of the IPC in so far as convictions of offenders in motor vehicle accidents are concerned. Offences under Chapter XIII of the MV Act, cannot abrogate the applicability of the provisions under Sections 297, 304, 304A, 337 and 338 of the IPC. The offences do not overlap, and therefore, the maxim of generalia specialibus nonderogant is inapplicable, and could not have been invoked. The offences prescribed under the IPC are independent of the offences prescribed under the M.V. Act. It cannot be said that prosecution of road traffic/motor vehicle offenders under the IPC would offend Section 5 of the IPC, as held by the High Court, in so far as punishment for offences nder the M.V. Act is concerned. This Court has time and again emphasised on the need to strictly punish offenders responsible for causing motor vehicle accidents. With rapidly increasing motorisation, India is facing an increasing burden of road traffic injuries and fatalities. The financial loss, emotional and social trauma caused to a family on losing a bread winner, or any other member of the family, or incapacitation of the victim cannot be quantified. We thus hold that a prosecution, if otherwise maintainable, would lie both under the IPC and the MV Act, since both the statutes operate with full vigour, in their own independent spheres. Even assuming that some of the provisions of the MV Act and IPC are overlapping, it cannot be said that the offences under both the statutes are incompatible. We set aside the directions issued by the Gauhati High Court to the States of Assam, Nagaland, Meghalaya, Manipur, Tripura, Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh to issue appropriate instructions to their subordinate officers to prosecute offenders in motor vehicle accidents only under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act,1988 and not the IPC - Criminals Appeals are allowed
Issues Involved:
1. Whether road traffic offences should be dealt with exclusively under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (M.V. Act) or can also be prosecuted under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC). Detailed Analysis: Issue 1: Exclusivity of the M.V. Act for Road Traffic Offences High Court's Findings: - The Gauhati High Court held that road traffic offences should be prosecuted solely under the M.V. Act and not under the IPC. The High Court reasoned that the M.V. Act is a special statute specifically enacted to deal with motor vehicle offences, and its provisions should prevail over the general provisions of the IPC. The Court asserted that the IPC does not expressly cover road traffic offences, and hence, prosecution under the IPC would be unsustainable in law. The High Court also directed the states to issue instructions to prosecute offenders only under the M.V. Act, with the exception of cases involving culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 IPC. Supreme Court's Findings: - The Supreme Court disagreed with the High Court's findings and held that there is no conflict between the provisions of the IPC and the M.V. Act. Both statutes operate in different spheres and provide for distinct offences and penalties. The Court emphasized that the principle of "generalia specialibus non derogant" (special law prevails over general law) does not apply in this context because the offences under the IPC and the M.V. Act are independent and distinct from each other. - The Supreme Court noted that the M.V. Act primarily deals with regulatory offences and provides a summary procedure for disposal of cases, whereas the IPC is punitive and deterrent in nature, dealing with more severe offences such as causing death or grievous hurt by rash and negligent driving. The Court pointed out that the M.V. Act does not provide for specific offences causing death or grievous hurt, which are covered under Sections 279, 304 Part II, 304A, 337, and 338 of the IPC. - The Supreme Court highlighted that Section 26 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, allows for prosecution under both the IPC and the M.V. Act, provided that the offender is not punished twice for the same offence. The Court cited previous judgments to support this interpretation, including T.S. Baliah v. T.S. Rangachari and State of Maharashtra v. Sayyed Hassan, which held that there is no bar to trial or conviction under two different enactments. - The Supreme Court also emphasized the need for strict punishment for offenders responsible for causing motor vehicle accidents, given the increasing burden of road traffic injuries and fatalities in India. The Court stressed that the principle of proportionality between crime and punishment must be maintained, and the punishment should be commensurate with the seriousness of the offence. Conclusion: - The Supreme Court set aside the directions issued by the Gauhati High Court to prosecute offenders in motor vehicle accidents only under the M.V. Act. The Court held that prosecution is maintainable under both the IPC and the M.V. Act, and both statutes operate with full vigor in their respective spheres. The interim order passed on 26.04.2010 was made absolute, and all pending applications were disposed of accordingly.
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