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Issues Involved:
1. Whether the claim application filed by the appellant under Section 15(2) of the Payment of Wages Act was time-barred. 2. Whether the deduction of wages for the period of inactive service was justified under Rule 2044 of the Railway Establishment Code and Section 7(2)(h) of the Payment of Wages Act. 3. Whether the appellant's claim for Running Allowance was rightly disallowed due to the failure to amend the petition in time. Detailed Analysis: 1. Limitation of Claim Application: The primary issue was whether the appellant's claim application under Section 15(2) of the Payment of Wages Act was time-barred. The appellant argued that the limitation period should start from the date of actual deduction of wages, which was either March 11, 1959, or February 13, 1959, when the decision to treat the period of inactive service as leave without pay was communicated. The respondents contended that the limitation period started from the date of dismissal, January 3, 1956, as wages accrued monthly. The court interpreted the first proviso to Section 15(2) of the Payment of Wages Act, which provides two alternative starting points for limitation: the date of deduction of wages or the date when the payment of wages was due. The court emphasized that these two termini are distinct and may not always coincide. In the appellant's case, the deduction took place on February 18, 1959, when it was decided to treat the period of inactive service as leave without pay. Therefore, the application filed on August 13, 1959, was within the six-month limitation period. 2. Justification of Wage Deduction: The second issue was whether the deduction of wages for the period of inactive service was justified under Rule 2044 of the Railway Establishment Code and Section 7(2)(h) of the Payment of Wages Act. The Additional District Judge had held that the deduction was valid as it was made under the order of a competent authority. The court referred to the decision in Devendra Pratap Narain Rai Sharma v. State of U.P., which held that Rule 54 of the U.P. Government Fundamental Rules, similar to Rule 2044 of the Railway Establishment Code, does not apply when dismissal is declared invalid by a civil court. Therefore, the deduction of wages was not justified, and the appellant was entitled to a refund of the deducted amount. 3. Claim for Running Allowance: The third issue was whether the appellant's claim for Running Allowance was rightly disallowed due to the failure to amend the petition in time. The appellant had initially claimed Traveling Allowance, which he later sought to amend to Running Allowance. The Authority did not permit the amendment as it was not carried out within the prescribed period. The court held that while the Code of Civil Procedure does not govern amendments of applications under Section 15(2) of the Act, the Authority can devise its own procedure based on principles of justice, equity, and good conscience. The appellant was found guilty of gross negligence for not amending the application in time. Furthermore, Running Allowance is counted towards average pay only when leave does not exceed one month, and the appellant was not entitled to it for the entire period of inactive service. Conclusion: The court reversed the finding of the Additional District Judge regarding the limitation and held that the application was within time. It also found that the deduction of wages was not justified and restored the order of the Prescribed Authority, directing the refund of the deducted amount. However, the claim for Running Allowance was rightly disallowed due to the appellant's negligence in amending the application. Observations on Government Litigation: The court, while concurring with the judgment, expressed concerns about the government's approach to litigation, emphasizing the need for a just settlement of claims and avoiding unnecessary litigation. The court highlighted the importance of the state acting as a virtuous litigant, concerned only with justice and social justice. Appeal Allowed.
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