1963 (2) TMI 55 - HC - Income Tax

Summary

Issues:
1. Delay in filing the application
2. Maintainability of the application under Article 226
3. Jurisdiction of the impugned orders
4. Violation of principles of natural justice

Analysis:

Delay in filing the application:
The petitioner filed the application under Article 226 to quash the orders of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Commissioner of Income-tax dated June 5, 1957, and February 3, 1960, respectively. The court noted a delay of over seven months from the final order of the Commissioner. However, the court held that the application cannot be rejected solely based on delay if the petitioner can establish violations of natural justice.

Maintainability of the application under Article 226:
The court clarified that the original assessment order cannot be challenged in the application as it merged in the appellate order. The petitioner's appeal to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was rejected, and the subsequent revision to the Commissioner under section 33A(2) was also dismissed. The court discussed the legislative changes and concluded that a writ of certiorari does not lie against an order of the Commissioner under section 33A(2).

Jurisdiction of the impugned orders:
The petitioner argued that the addition of income from the share in the business of an unregistered firm was without jurisdiction as the firm was not assessed properly. The court analyzed the relevant provisions and held that the tax had been paid by the receivers representing the firm, thus justifying the addition of income for tax purposes.

Violation of principles of natural justice:
Regarding the contention of the petitioner that the principles of natural justice were violated, the court emphasized that the order under section 33A(2) is administrative and discretionary in nature. The court held that the doctrine of natural justice cannot be applied as there is no obligation to provide a hearing to the assessee.

In conclusion, the court dismissed the application, stating that the petitioner did not pursue statutory remedies against the assessment order and that defects in assessment proceedings should be addressed through statutory appeals rather than through Article 226 applications. The court discharged the rule with no order as to costs.