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Issues Involved:
1. Competency of the appeal under Article 329(b) of the Constitution. 2. Improper acceptance of nomination under Section 100(1)(c) of the Representation of the People Act. 3. Non-compliance with the provisions of the Constitution under Section 100(2)(c) of the Representation of the People Act. Detailed Analysis: Competency of the Appeal: The respondent's counsel argued that Article 329(b) of the Constitution ousts the jurisdiction of all ordinary courts in election disputes, allowing challenges only through an election petition as per the Representation of the People Act. Sections 80 and 105 of the Act were cited to argue that the Tribunal's decision is final and conclusive. However, the Supreme Court found these arguments untenable. The Court held that while the Election Tribunal's jurisdiction is special and exclusive for election disputes, the Supreme Court retains overriding power to grant special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution. This power cannot be excluded by any Parliamentary legislation. The Court emphasized that Article 136 provides plenary jurisdiction to entertain appeals against any judgment or order made by a Court or Tribunal, including the Election Tribunal. The decision in Bharat Bank Ltd. v. Employees of the Bharat Bank Ltd. was cited to support that "Tribunal" under Article 136 includes all adjudicating bodies constituted by the State with judicial functions. The Court also distinguished the case from the Privy Council decision in Theberge v. Laudry, noting that Article 136 is a constitutional provision that cannot be limited by Parliamentary legislation. The Court concluded that there is no prohibition on exercising its powers under Article 136 against the decision of an Election Tribunal. The preliminary point raised by the respondent was thus dismissed. Improper Acceptance of Nomination: The appellant's counsel argued that the improper acceptance of Vasant Rao's nomination did not occur as alleged. The Tribunal had found that Vasant Rao was under 25 years of age and thus constitutionally disqualified. The appellant conceded this finding but argued that the acceptance of Vasant Rao's nomination was not improper under Section 100(1)(c) of the Act. The Court examined Section 36 of the Act, which outlines the scrutiny of nominations. It found that the Returning Officer must accept nominations unless a disqualification is apparent on the face of the electoral roll or the nomination paper, or if an objection is raised and evidence presented. Since no objection was raised, and Vasant Rao's electoral roll entry did not indicate any disqualification, the Returning Officer's acceptance of the nomination was proper. The Court held that improper acceptance would occur if the disqualification was evident or if an objection was wrongly dismissed. Since neither condition was met, the acceptance was deemed proper. The case thus did not fall under Section 100(1)(c) but under Section 100(2)(c), which addresses non-compliance with constitutional provisions. Non-compliance with Constitutional Provisions: The Court agreed with the appellant that the case involved non-compliance with the Constitution, specifically Article 173, due to Vasant Rao's age disqualification. This non-compliance materially affected the election result, making the election of Vasant Rao void under Section 100(2)(c) of the Act. The Court clarified that "non-compliance with the provisions of the Constitution" includes fundamental disqualifications not apparent during the nomination scrutiny. This provision serves as a residuary clause for constitutional infractions not specifically enumerated elsewhere in the Act. Conclusion: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal in part, modifying the Election Tribunal's order to declare only the election of Vasant Rao void, while upholding the appellant's election. No order as to costs was made.
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