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Issues Involved:
1. Whether the State of Punjab, exercising its appellate jurisdiction under Rule 6(6) of the Punjab Welfare Officers Recruitment and Conditions of Service Rules, 1952, is a Tribunal within the meaning of Article 136(1) of the Constitution. 2. Validity of the appellate order passed by the State of Punjab directing reinstatement of the Welfare Officer. 3. Whether the appeal preferred by the Welfare Officer before the State Government was competent under Rule 6(6). 4. Validity of Rule 6(3) of the Punjab Welfare Officers Recruitment and Conditions of Service Rules, 1952, in requiring the concurrence of the Labour Commissioner before the management can dismiss or terminate the services of a Welfare Officer. Issue-wise Detailed Analysis: 1. Tribunal Status under Article 136(1): The primary issue was whether the State of Punjab, while exercising its appellate jurisdiction under Rule 6(6) of the Punjab Welfare Officers Recruitment and Conditions of Service Rules, 1952, qualifies as a Tribunal under Article 136(1) of the Constitution. The Supreme Court held that the State Government, in this context, is a Tribunal. The Court reasoned that the power conferred on the State Government by Rule 6(6) is a part of the State's judicial power, involving adjudication of disputes between the management and Welfare Officers. The decision of the State Government is final and binding, and it must act judicially, giving parties the opportunity to present their cases. Therefore, the State Government exercises judicial power and functions as a Tribunal under Article 136(1). 2. Validity of the Appellate Order: The appellant challenged the validity of the appellate order passed by the State Government directing the reinstatement of the Welfare Officer. The Supreme Court found that the appellate order was invalid and erroneous. The Court noted that the management's termination of the Welfare Officer's services was in accordance with the terms of his appointment, specifically Clause 4, which allowed termination with one month's notice or salary in lieu thereof. Since the termination was not punitive but a discharge as per the employment contract, it did not fall under Rule 6(3)(v), which concerns punitive dismissals or terminations. Therefore, the appellate order directing reinstatement was without jurisdiction. 3. Competence of the Appeal under Rule 6(6): The Supreme Court examined whether the appeal preferred by the Welfare Officer before the State Government was competent under Rule 6(6). The Court held that the appeal was incompetent. Rule 6(6) allows an appeal if the dismissal or termination of service is punitive and imposed without the Labour Commissioner's concurrence. In this case, the termination was a discharge under the terms of employment and not a punitive action. Consequently, the appeal did not meet the criteria under Rule 6(6), making it invalid. 4. Validity of Rule 6(3): The appellant argued that Rule 6(3), which requires the Labour Commissioner's concurrence before dismissing or terminating a Welfare Officer, was ultra vires Section 49(2) of the Factories Act, 1948. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, stating that the words "conditions of service" in Section 49(2) are broad enough to include the requirement for the Labour Commissioner's concurrence. The Rule aims to provide special protection to Welfare Officers, ensuring their security of tenure. Hence, Rule 6(3) was within the scope of the State Government's authority under Section 49(2) and was valid. Conclusion: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the impugned order passed by the State Government on the grounds that it was passed without jurisdiction. The Court confirmed that the State Government, while exercising its appellate jurisdiction under Rule 6(6), acts as a Tribunal under Article 136(1). However, the appeal by the Welfare Officer was incompetent as the termination was a discharge under the employment contract, not a punitive action. The validity of Rule 6(3) was upheld, affirming the requirement for the Labour Commissioner's concurrence in punitive dismissals or terminations.
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