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Issues Involved:
1. Whether an appeal may be entertained in exercise of powers under Art. 136 of the Constitution against a direction of the Conciliation Officer. 2. Whether an appeal lies to the Labour Appellate Tribunal under the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950, against the direction issued by the Conciliation Officer. Issue-wise Detailed Analysis: 1. Appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution: The Supreme Court first examined whether the direction made by the Conciliation Officer qualifies as a "determination" or "order" under Article 136 of the Constitution. The Court clarified that for an appeal to be maintainable under Article 136, the decision must be judicial or quasi-judicial and not purely administrative. A judicial decision involves the authority to determine questions affecting the rights of citizens and requires the authority to act judicially. The Court noted that the Conciliation Officer, under Clause 29 of the Order promulgated under the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, has to act judicially in granting or refusing permission to alter the terms of employment of workmen. However, the Court concluded that the Conciliation Officer is not a "tribunal" within the meaning of Article 136 because he is not invested with the judicial power of the State. The Conciliation Officer's role is limited to removing a statutory ban on the employer's common law right to dismiss or alter the terms of employment, and he does not deliver a determinative judgment or award affecting the rights and obligations of parties. Therefore, an appeal under Article 136 against the Conciliation Officer's direction is not maintainable. 2. Appeal to the Labour Appellate Tribunal: The Court then considered whether an appeal lies to the Labour Appellate Tribunal under the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950. Section 4 of the Act authorizes the Central Government to constitute Labour Appellate Tribunals for hearing appeals from the awards or decisions of industrial tribunals. The Court noted that the Conciliation Officer under Clause 29 is not an "Industrial Tribunal" constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, nor is there any provision in the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, or Orders made thereunder for an appeal to any similar authority against the direction made by the Conciliation Officer. The Court further explained that the term "other authority" in Section 2(c)(iii) of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act must be read ejusdem generis with "Court" or "Board," implying that the authority must be constituted for the purpose of adjudication of industrial disputes. Since the Conciliation Officer's functions are incidental to industrial adjudication and he does not deliver definitive judgments affecting the rights of parties, he cannot be regarded as an "authority" within the meaning of Section 2(c)(iii). Consequently, an appeal against the Conciliation Officer's direction to the Labour Appellate Tribunal is not maintainable. Conclusion: Both appeals were dismissed as the Supreme Court held that an appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution against the direction of the Conciliation Officer is not competent, and an appeal to the Labour Appellate Tribunal under the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950, is not maintainable. The Court emphasized that the Conciliation Officer is not a tribunal within the meaning of Article 136 and does not have the judicial power of the State.
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