1991 (7) TMI 372 - SC - Indian Laws

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Legislative Fraud and Section 433A
2. Applicability of Section 433A vis-à-vis Articles 72 and 161
3. Conflict between Maru Ram and Kehar Singh Judgments
4. Interpretation of "Remission" and "Remit" in Articles 72 and 161
5. Conditional Premature Release before 14 Years

Summary:

1. Legislative Fraud and Section 433A:
The petitioner contended that the insertion of Section 433A in the Code was a legislative fraud because the related Indian Penal Code (Amendment) Bill, 1978, which proposed bifurcating Section 302 IPC and other changes, did not become law. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, stating that the failure of the Lok Sabha to pass the IPC Amendment Bill did not render the enactment of Section 433A a "legislative fraud" or "colourable exercise of legislative power." The Court emphasized that legislative competence was not in question, and no mala fides were involved in the enactment of Section 433A.

2. Applicability of Section 433A vis-à-vis Articles 72 and 161:
The petitioner argued that Section 433A of the Code could not override the constitutional powers conferred by Articles 72 and 161 on the President and Governor, respectively. The Supreme Court held that while Section 433A restricts the exercise of powers under Sections 432 and 433 of the Code, it does not affect the constitutional powers under Articles 72 and 161. These constitutional powers can be exercised independently, treating existing remission rules as guidelines.

3. Conflict between Maru Ram and Kehar Singh Judgments:
The petitioner questioned whether Maru Ram's decision conflicted with Kehar Singh's judgment regarding the necessity of guidelines for exercising power under Articles 72 and 161. The Supreme Court clarified that Maru Ram's recommendation for guidelines was not binding and that Kehar Singh's judgment did not overturn any ratio laid down in Maru Ram's case. The Court held that the language of Articles 72 and 161 itself provided sufficient guidelines for exercising clemency powers.

4. Interpretation of "Remission" and "Remit" in Articles 72 and 161:
The petitioner raised the issue of whether the terms "remission" and "remit" in Articles 72 and 161 had different meanings. The Supreme Court declined to express an opinion on this abstract question in the absence of a specific fact situation.

5. Conditional Premature Release before 14 Years:
The petitioner posed a hypothetical question about the legality of granting conditional premature release to a life convict before completing 14 years of actual imprisonment. The Supreme Court refrained from making general observations, stating that the legality of such release would depend on the specific conditions imposed and the circumstances of each case.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court dismissed the writ petition, stating that the petitioner had not completed 14 years of actual incarceration and could not invoke Sections 432 and 433 of the Code. The Court found no basis to declare the petitioner's continued detention as illegal or void. The petitioner was advised to approach the High Court for compliance with its order regarding the pending clemency application.