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Issues Involved:
1. Constitutional validity of Section 2(3) and (5) of the Prevention of Terrorism (Repeal) Act, 2004. 2. Interpretation of Section 2(3) of the Prevention of Terrorism (Repeal) Act, 2004 in relation to Section 321 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. 3. Whether the provisions of Section 2(3) and (5) of the Repealing Act encroach upon judicial power and violate the separation of powers doctrine. Detailed Analysis: 1. Constitutional Validity of Section 2(3) and (5) of the Prevention of Terrorism (Repeal) Act, 2004: The Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of Section 2(3) and (5) of the Repealing Act. The Court noted that Parliament has the exclusive competence to legislate on terrorism, which falls under Entry 1 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. The Court emphasized the presumption in favor of the constitutionality of an enactment and the burden on the challenger to prove a clear transgression of constitutional principles. The Court also reiterated that a law made by Parliament can be struck down only on grounds of lack of legislative competence or violation of fundamental rights guaranteed under Part-III of the Constitution. The Court concluded that the Repealing Act, including Section 2(3) and (5), is valid and constitutional. 2. Interpretation of Section 2(3) of the Prevention of Terrorism (Repeal) Act, 2004 in Relation to Section 321 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: The Supreme Court held that Section 2(3) of the Repealing Act does not require compliance with Section 321 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) for the withdrawal of cases. The Court observed that the clear legislative intent of Section 2(3) is that when the Review Committee opines that there is no prima facie case for proceeding against the accused, such cases, even if cognizance has been taken by the court, shall be deemed to have been withdrawn without any further action. The Court emphasized that bringing Section 321 CrPC into play would render the provision in Section 2(3) that the cases shall be deemed to be withdrawn nugatory. The Court concluded that the High Court erred in assuming that the decision of the Madras High Court, approved by the Supreme Court with reference to Section 60(4) to (7) of POTA, would apply to Section 2(3) of the Repealing Act. 3. Encroachment upon Judicial Power and Violation of the Separation of Powers Doctrine: The Supreme Court addressed the concern that Section 2(3) and (5) of the Repealing Act might encroach upon judicial power and violate the separation of powers doctrine. The Court noted that judicial review is an essential feature of the Constitution and forms part of its basic structure. The Court emphasized that while the Review Committee's decision to withdraw cases is final, it is subject to judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Court concluded that the availability of judicial review under Article 226 is a sufficient safeguard against any misuse or abuse of power by the Review Committee. The Court held that the Repealing Act does not violate the principle of separation of powers, as it does not strip the higher judiciary of its power of judicial review. Conclusion: The Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of Section 2(3) and (5) of the Prevention of Terrorism (Repeal) Act, 2004. It clarified that Section 2(3) of the Repealing Act does not require compliance with Section 321 CrPC for the withdrawal of cases and that the Review Committee's decisions are subject to judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Court concluded that the Repealing Act does not violate the principle of separation of powers. The appeals by the POTA accused were allowed in part, and the appeals by the relatives of victims were disposed of with the liberty to challenge the opinions of the Review Committee.
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