1999 (4) TMI 615 - SC - Indian Laws

In absence of any constitutional or statutory rights being involved a writ proceeding would not lie to enforce contractual obligations even if it is sought to be enforced against State or to avoid contractual liability arising thereto.

Summary

Issues Involved:

1. Validity of the renewal of the lease deed.
2. Jurisdiction of the High Court in entertaining the writ petition.
3. Delay (laches) in filing the writ petition.
4. Appropriateness of the writ remedy.
5. Interpretation of clause 3(g) of the lease deed.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Validity of the renewal of the lease deed:

The lease deed dated 1-9-1970 was initially for a period of 10 years, renewable as per the terms of the lease. The appellant exercised the option to renew the lease for a further term of 10 years from 1-10-1979. Later, the appellant sought to renew the lease for an additional 20 years starting from 1-10-1989. The respondent contended that no deed was executed renewing the lease after its expiry on 30-9-1979, thus making the appellant a trespasser. The High Court held that without a fresh deed, clause 3(g) of the lease deed was not acted upon, and the appellant could not enforce a second renewal after 1989. The Supreme Court, however, found that the appellant could only seek renewal in terms of Section 7 of the Act, which allowed for one term of renewal as originally granted, and not beyond 30-9-1999.

2. Jurisdiction of the High Court in entertaining the writ petition:

The appellants argued that the writ petition was not an appropriate remedy as it involved disputed questions of fact regarding the renewal of the lease. The Supreme Court observed that in the absence of constitutional or statutory rights, a writ proceeding would not lie to enforce contractual obligations. However, since the appellants exercised their powers under Section 7 of the Act, the respondent could approach the writ court. The High Court's discretion in entertaining the petition was not deemed incorrect.

3. Delay (laches) in filing the writ petition:

The appellants contended that the writ petition filed on 23-3-1993 should have been dismissed due to laches, as the letter exercising the option to renew the lease was sent on 13-9-1989. The Supreme Court noted that delay alone does not defeat a claim unless the position of the appellant had been altered due to the lapse of time. Since this contention was not raised before the High Court, the Supreme Court did not allow it to be raised for the first time. The period for which the renewal option had been exercised had not ended, and the respondent could still challenge the exercise of the option.

4. Appropriateness of the writ remedy:

The Supreme Court held that where interpretation of a contract related to immovable property arises, a civil suit is generally the appropriate remedy. However, if the facts do not involve complicated questions needing elaborate investigation, the High Court can exercise writ jurisdiction under Article 226. The High Court's decision to entertain the writ petition was not deemed wrong.

5. Interpretation of clause 3(g) of the lease deed:

Clause 3(g) of the lease deed provided for two renewals of 10 years each. The High Court viewed that without a fresh deed, the clause was not acted upon. The Supreme Court found that the lease could be renewed for one term under Section 7 of the Act, but not beyond 30-9-1999. The appellant's notice of renewal in 1979 and 1989 was valid under the lease deed and the Act, but the appellant could not claim renewal beyond 1999.

Final Judgment:

The Supreme Court modified the High Court's order as follows:
1. The appellant cannot claim renewal of the lease beyond 30-9-1999.
2. The appellant is granted time to hand over vacant possession by 31-3-2000, subject to an undertaking.
3. Rent payable is Rs. 1920 per month till the date of handing over possession.
4. Any arrears of rent to be paid within three months.
5. Inconsistent parts of the High Court's order are set aside.

The appeal was disposed of accordingly.