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Issues involved:
The issues involved in this case include the revival of a decree after a significant delay, the interpretation of the law of limitation, the enforceability of a decree, and the impact of dismissing an appeal as time-barred on the enforceability of the decree. Revival of Decree: The appellant secured a decree for possession of the suit property, but due to a substantial delay in filing the execution petition, the decree became unenforceable under the Limitation Act. The appellant sought to rely on an order of the High Court rejecting a Second Appeal by the respondent, which was dismissed as time-barred. The Execution Court revived the decree based on this order, but the District Court, in a revision, held otherwise. Interpretation of Law of Limitation: The appellant argued that the dismissal of the Second Appeal would alter the timeline for enforcement, contending that the law of limitation should prevent the scuttling of remedies. Article 136 of the Limitation Act 1963 provides a 12-year period for executing a decree from the date it becomes enforceable, as clarified in the Objects and Reasons for amending the previous Article 182. Enforceability of Decree: The enforceability of a decree commences from its date unless specified otherwise, and the filing of an appeal does not affect its enforceability unless stayed by the appellate court. A decree is defined as a conclusive determination of rights in a suit, and rejection of an application for condonation of delay does not amount to a decree. The dismissal of an appeal as time-barred also does not constitute a decree. Impact of Dismissing Appeal on Decree Enforceability: The dismissal of the Second Appeal by the High Court did not affect the enforceability of the decree passed by the first appellate court. The decree became enforceable on 1.8.1973 when the appellate court's decree superseded the trial court's decree. As no decree was passed by the High Court in the Second Appeal, the enforceability of the first appellate court's decree remained undisturbed for 12 years, rendering the execution process initiated by the appellant after the limitation period irretrievably barred. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming that the execution process initiated by the appellant long after the expiry of the 12-year limitation period from 1.8.1973 was irretrievably barred. The Court clarified the interpretation of the law of limitation, the enforceability of decrees, and the impact of dismissing an appeal as time-barred on the enforceability of the original decree.
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