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Issues Involved:
1. Interpretation of provisions of the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution. 2. Legality of the respondent's suspension without District Council approval. 3. Custom and usage regarding the removal of the Siem. 4. Jurisdiction and authority of the Executive Committee of the District Council. 5. Validity of interim suspension and withholding of remuneration. Detailed Analysis: 1. Interpretation of provisions of the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution: The appeal raised questions about the interpretation of provisions in the Sixth Schedule. The respondent, who was the Siem of Mylliem, contended that his suspension by the Executive Committee of the District Council was illegal and ultra vires, arguing that the Sixth Schedule required legislation for such actions. The High Court held that the District Council could only act by making law with the Governor's assent and not by passing administrative orders. However, the Supreme Court clarified that the administration of autonomous districts vested in the District Council under para. 2(4) of the Sixth Schedule included executive powers necessary for administration. Thus, the District Council had the power to appoint and remove officers without prior legislation. 2. Legality of the respondent's suspension without District Council approval: The respondent argued that his suspension was without jurisdiction as it lacked District Council approval. The Supreme Court noted that the Executive Committee acted under Rule 30(a) of the Assam Autonomous Districts (Constitution of District Councils) Rules, 1951, which allowed immediate action in emergencies, subject to later ratification by the District Council. The Court held that the Executive Committee's action was within its power, given the emergency context, and thus valid. 3. Custom and usage regarding the removal of the Siem: The respondent claimed that custom required a referendum for his removal. The appellant contended that no such custom existed and that the Siem could be removed by the appointing authority for misconduct. The Supreme Court did not delve into the custom's existence but focused on the legal framework post-Constitution. It held that the respondent's appointment and removal were governed by the terms set by the District Council, which did not require a referendum. 4. Jurisdiction and authority of the Executive Committee of the District Council: The High Court's view that the District Council could only act legislatively regarding the appointment and removal of Chiefs was rejected. The Supreme Court emphasized that the District Council's administrative powers under para. 2(4) included appointing and removing officers. The Executive Committee, acting under Rule 30(a), had the authority to suspend the respondent in an emergency, pending District Council approval. 5. Validity of interim suspension and withholding of remuneration: The Supreme Court referenced the Management of Hotel Imperial v. Hotel Workers' Union case, which established that interim suspension without express contractual or statutory authority does not permit withholding remuneration. The Court found no express term or statutory provision allowing the District Council to withhold the respondent's remuneration during suspension. Therefore, while the interim suspension was valid, the respondent was entitled to full remuneration unless a statute or rule provided otherwise. Conclusion: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's order, and directed further action per its findings. It confirmed the District Council's authority to appoint and remove officers administratively and validated the Executive Committee's emergency suspension of the respondent, subject to remuneration conditions. The enactment of the United Khasi-Jaintia Hills Autonomous District (Appointment and Succession of Chiefs and Headmen) Act, 1959, provided a legal framework for future actions regarding the appointment and removal of Chiefs.
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