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Issues Involved:
1. Representation of an employee in disciplinary proceedings. 2. Applicability and modification of Model Standing Orders. 3. Jurisdiction and powers of the Certifying Officer and Appellate Authority under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946. Summary: 1. Representation of an Employee in Disciplinary Proceedings: The core issue in this case was whether an employee, against whom disciplinary proceedings have been initiated, can claim to be represented by a person who, though a member of a Trade Union, is not an employee of the appellant-corporation. The Model Standing Orders u/s 14(4)(ba) allowed a workman to be represented by an office bearer of a trade union of which he is a member. However, Clause 29(4) of the Draft Standing Orders, as certified by the Appellate Authority, restricted this right to representation by a fellow workman who must be an employee of the Corporation. The Supreme Court held that the right to representation is not an absolute right and can be regulated or restricted by statute or certified Standing Orders. The Court concluded that the High Court erred in quashing the order of the Appellate Authority, which had certified the Draft Standing Orders. 2. Applicability and Modification of Model Standing Orders: The Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, mandates that Model Standing Orders apply temporarily until the establishment's own Standing Orders are certified. The appellant argued that once the Standing Orders are certified, they replace the Model Standing Orders. The respondent contended that the Standing Orders must conform to the Model Standing Orders without deviation. The Supreme Court clarified that the Standing Orders need to be in consonance with the Model Standing Orders and be fair and reasonable, but they do not have to be identical. The Court found that the certified Standing Orders were reasonable and did not deviate significantly from the Model Standing Orders. 3. Jurisdiction and Powers of the Certifying Officer and Appellate Authority: The Certifying Officer and the Appellate Authority have the jurisdiction to certify Standing Orders and ensure they are fair and reasonable. The Supreme Court noted that the jurisdiction of these authorities was expanded in 1956 to include adjudicating the fairness and reasonableness of the Standing Orders. The Court upheld the Appellate Authority's decision to certify the Draft Standing Orders, finding them to be in compliance with the Act and reasonable. Conclusion: The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the Bombay High Court's judgment, and upheld the order of the Appellate Authority certifying the Draft Standing Orders. The Court emphasized that the right to representation in disciplinary proceedings is not absolute and can be restricted by certified Standing Orders. The certified Standing Orders were found to be reasonable and in consonance with the Model Standing Orders.
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