2011 (10) TMI 668 - SC - Indian Laws

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Whether the acquisition of the appellant's land lapsed due to non-passing of an award within the period specified u/s 11A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
2. Interpretation of Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
3. Applicability of the judgment in Padma Sundara Rao v. State of Tamil Nadu.
4. Timeliness of the writ petition filed by the appellant.

Summary:

1. Lapse of Acquisition Due to Non-Passing of Award:
The primary issue was whether the acquisition of the appellant's land lapsed because the award was not passed within the two-year period specified u/s 11A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The appellant argued that the award dated 10.12.1996 was passed beyond the stipulated period, thus rendering the acquisition void.

2. Interpretation of Section 11A:
Section 11A mandates that the Collector must make an award within two years from the date of the publication of the declaration u/s 6. If no award is made within that period, the acquisition proceedings automatically lapse. The explanation to Section 11A allows for the exclusion of the period during which any action or proceeding is stayed by a court order in computing the two-year period.

3. Applicability of Padma Sundara Rao Judgment:
The Division Bench of the High Court relied on several judgments, including Padma Sundara Rao v. State of Tamil Nadu, to conclude that the acquisition proceedings had become final and the writ petition was belated. However, the Supreme Court clarified that the last paragraph of the Padma Sundara Rao judgment, which suggests that the law laid down would not apply to cases where the acquisition had become final, did not apply here because the writ petition was pending at the time of the Constitution Bench's decision.

4. Timeliness of the Writ Petition:
The Division Bench of the High Court had also considered the writ petition to be highly belated. However, the Supreme Court found that the appellant and the proforma respondents had filed the writ petition immediately after the award was pronounced, thus there was no delay. The High Court's invocation of the rule of laches was deemed inappropriate.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the impugned judgment of the Division Bench, and restored the order of the learned Single Judge, thereby declaring that the acquisition of the appellant's land had lapsed due to the non-passing of the award within the specified period u/s 11A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.