1990 (4) TMI 289 - SC - Indian Laws

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Whether the demised premises constitute a "building" within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Rent Control Act.
2. Whether the lease was primarily of the land or of the building, or a composite lease of both.
3. Applicability of the Rent Control Act to the lease in question.
4. Interpretation of the term "kaichalai" and its significance in the lease.
5. Determination of the dominant intention of the parties in the lease agreement.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Whether the demised premises constitute a "building" within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Rent Control Act:
The court examined the definition of "building" under Section 2(2) of the Rent Control Act, which includes any building or hut let for residential or non-residential purposes, along with appurtenant grounds. The term "kaichalai" was scrutinized and deemed to fit within this definition, as it denotes a structure or roof put up by hand, capable of being used for various purposes. The court concluded that the "kaichalai" in question is indeed a "building" within the meaning of Section 2(2).

2. Whether the lease was primarily of the land or of the building, or a composite lease of both:
The court assessed the terms of the lease and the surrounding circumstances to determine the parties' intention. The lease deeds emphasized the "kaichalai" and required it to be returned in good condition, indicating its significance. The court found that the lease was a composite one, involving both the land and the building, with the land intended for a petrol pump and the "kaichalai" for business use.

3. Applicability of the Rent Control Act to the lease in question:
The court rejected the argument that the lease was solely for the land, noting that the "kaichalai" was a substantial structure used for business purposes. The court emphasized that the Rent Control Act applies to both residential and non-residential buildings and that the "kaichalai" falls within this scope. The court also dismissed the notion that the dominant purpose of the lease should govern its applicability, instead focusing on the composite nature of the lease.

4. Interpretation of the term "kaichalai" and its significance in the lease:
The term "kaichalai" was interpreted as a structure or roof put up by hand, substantial in size, and used for business purposes. The court noted that the lease deeds gave prominence to the "kaichalai" and required its retention, indicating its importance. The court concluded that the "kaichalai" was not an insignificant structure and played a crucial role in the lease agreement.

5. Determination of the dominant intention of the parties in the lease agreement:
The court examined the lease deeds and the parties' conduct to ascertain their intention. The court found that the lessor intended to lease both the land and the "kaichalai" as a composite property. The lessee's use of the "kaichalai" for business purposes and the emphasis on its retention in the lease deeds supported this conclusion. The court determined that the lease was a composite one, involving both the land and the building, and thus fell within the scope of the Rent Control Act.

Conclusion:
The court dismissed the appeal, upholding the judgments of the lower courts. It concluded that the "kaichalai" constituted a "building" under the Rent Control Act, and the lease was a composite one involving both the land and the building. The appeal was dismissed without any order as to costs.