1968 (3) TMI 112 - SC - Indian Laws

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Composition of inam grants (kudiwaram and melwaram rights)
2. Nature of inams (personal inams vs. office-holder inams)
3. Retrospective operation of Section 44-B of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act
4. Validity of alienation under Section 44-B(2)(a)(i)
5. Adverse possession extinguishing the right of resumption

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Composition of Inam Grants:
The two courts concurrently held that the inams comprised both the kudiwaram and the melwaram. The District Judge and the High Court found that the inams included both the rights in the land. The plaintiffs claimed title to the lands under a grant from the inamdars on the footing that the inamdars were entitled to the kudiwaram and the melwaram. The conclusion is irresistible that the inam comprised both the warams.

2. Nature of Inams:
The District Judge held that the inams were personal inams burdened with services, thus making the order of resumption illegal and a nullity. However, the High Court reversed this finding, holding that the inams were for the performance of services connected with the temple and were resumable under Section 44-B. The inams were granted to office-holders as remuneration for services to be rendered by them in connection with the temple, and not as personal inams burdened with a condition of service.

3. Retrospective Operation of Section 44-B:
The High Court did not express any opinion on whether Section 44-B was retrospective in operation. However, the Supreme Court clarified that Section 44-B(2)(a)(i) allows a resumption of the inam where there has been an alienation of the inam either before or after 1934. The section is prospective in its direct operation as it authorizes only future resumption after it came into force, even if the grounds for such resumption arose earlier.

4. Validity of Alienation under Section 44-B(2)(a)(i):
The plaintiffs failed to prove that the inamdars sold the lands. The evidence showed that the lands were held under a cowle lease, which is a lease. The High Court and the District Collector held that the alienation was within the purview of Section 44-B. The Supreme Court noted that the plaintiffs should not be allowed to raise the novel contention that the lease was from year to year at this late stage. The materials on record did not support this contention, and it was presumed that the cowle granted a permanent lease, making the inams resumable under Section 44-B(2)(a)(i).

5. Adverse Possession Extinguishing the Right of Resumption:
The District Judge held that the right to resume an inam could not be extinguished by adverse possession, and the claim of adverse possession was not established. The High Court concurred, stating that it was not established that the plaintiffs and their predecessors-in-title were in possession of the inam lands adversely to the inamdars or the Government. The Supreme Court affirmed that there is no period of limitation prescribed for the initiation of proceedings under Section 44-B(2), and the possession of the plaintiffs was not adverse to the inamdars or the Government. Therefore, the Government could resume the inam lands under Section 44-B(2) and dispossess the inamdars and the plaintiffs claiming as lessees under them.

Conclusion:
The appeals were dismissed, and it was held that both the kudiwaram and melwaram rights were rightly resumed under Section 44-B(2)(a)(i). There was no order as to costs.