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Issues Involved:
1. Interpretation of the term "interlocutory order" u/s 397(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. 2. Applicability of inherent powers u/s 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 in relation to interlocutory orders. Summary: Issue 1: Interpretation of "Interlocutory Order" u/s 397(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 The Supreme Court addressed the interpretation, scope, and ambit of the term "interlocutory order" as it appears in sub-s. (2) of s. 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The Court noted that historically, the 1898 Code and the 1955 Amendment provided the High Courts with broad revisional powers, which included examining both final and interlocutory orders. However, the 1973 Code introduced s. 397(2) to curb delays and prevent the exploitation of the accused by limiting revisions against interlocutory orders. The Court emphasized that "interlocutory order" in s. 397(2) should be interpreted in a restricted sense, referring to orders of a purely interim or temporary nature that do not decide or touch upon the important rights or liabilities of the parties. Orders that substantially affect the rights of the accused or adjudicate certain rights cannot be considered interlocutory and thus are not barred from revision under s. 397(2). Issue 2: Applicability of Inherent Powers u/s 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 The Court agreed with the High Court's view that where a revision to the High Court is expressly barred under sub-s. (2) of s. 397, the inherent powers u/s 482 cannot be invoked to defeat this bar. Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court but does not confer new powers. A harmonious construction of ss. 397 and 482 indicates that if an order is expressly barred from revision under s. 397(2), s. 482 cannot be applied to circumvent this restriction. The inherent powers of the Court are generally exercised in the absence of an express provision on the subject matter. Application to the Case: The Court examined whether the order of the Judicial Magistrate summoning the appellants was an interlocutory order. The appellants had been released by the Judicial Magistrate after the police submitted a final report against them, which was affirmed by the Additional Sessions Judge. The subsequent complaint by the respondent was dismissed, but the Sessions Judge ordered further inquiry, leading to the Magistrate summoning the appellants. The Court held that the order summoning the appellants was not merely interlocutory, as it substantially affected their rights and involved a decision regarding their trial. Therefore, the order did not fall within the mischief of sub-s. (2) of s. 397 and was subject to revision. Conclusion: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's order refusing to entertain the revision petition, and directed the High Court to admit and decide the revision petition on its merits in accordance with the law. The Court refrained from making any observations regarding the merits of the case. Appeal allowed.
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