2019 (12) TMI 1479 - HC - Indian Laws

Examination of the documents in the lis to the expert for his opinion - Section 45 of the Evidence Act - what are the orders that can be construed as intermediate or quasi final orders and whether the order passed under Section 45 of the Evidence Act is an interlocutory order or intermediate order and whether revision against the said order is maintainable or not? HELD THAT - Undoubtedly, the impugned orders under Section 45 of the Evidence Act were passed by the trial Courts during the pendency of the trial of the main cases. Irrespective of the fact whether the said petition filed under Section 45 of the Evidence Act is allowed or dismissed, the proceedings of the main criminal case still subsists and continues. So, it does not decide anything finally relating to the main case - the revision petitioners sought to contend that since the order passed under Section 45 of the Evidence Act pertains to the right of the accused in relation to the trial of the case to prove his deference in the case, it is to be construed as an intermediate order or a quasi final order. From the survey of law made as to what orders can be construed as intermediate orders or quasi final orders on the principle that it is an order which is of matter of moment or that it touches the substantial rights and liabilities of the parties in relation to the trial, the legal position is now clear from the precedential guidance given in the three-Judge Bench judgment of the Apex Court in Girish Kumar Suneja 2017 (7) TMI 1088 - SUPREME COURT that those orders which have the effect of terminating the proceedings of the main case once for all though passed at interlocutory stage are alone to be construed as an intermediate or quasi final order. That is the only feasible test to decide whether a particular order is an interlocutory order or an intermediate or quasi final order for the purpose of maintaining revision under Section 397(1) Cr.P.C. Therefore, in the considered opinion of this Court, the said concept of intermediate order cannot be stretched to that extent so as to take within its fold all other interlocutory orders which are passed during the trial of the case relating to summoning of witnesses and sending the document to experts for examination etc. on the ground that it touches the rights and liabilities of the party in relation to trial of the case. Since the order passed under Section 45 of the Evidence Act do not decide anything finally and results into culminating the main proceeding of the case, in any way, it cannot be construed as an order which is of matter of moment or as an intermediate or quasi final order so as to maintain revision against the said order. It is held that on par with the law laid down in Sethuraman 2000 (5) TMI 1086 - SUPREME COURT that an order summoning a witness or calling for a document is an interlocutory order against which revision is barred, the order passed under Section 45 of the Evidence Act is also a pure and simple interlocutory order against which revision is barred under Section 397(2) Cr.P.C. Criminal Revision Cases are dismissed as not maintainable under law.

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Maintainability of Criminal Revision Cases under Section 397(1) Cr.P.C. against orders passed under Section 45 of the Evidence Act.
2. Determination of whether orders under Section 45 of the Evidence Act are interlocutory, intermediate, or quasi-final orders.

Issue-Wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Maintainability of Criminal Revision Cases under Section 397(1) Cr.P.C. against orders passed under Section 45 of the Evidence Act:

All Criminal Revision Cases arise from orders on petitions filed under Section 45 of the Evidence Act to send disputed documents for expert examination. The core question is whether such orders are interlocutory, attracting the bar under Section 397(2) Cr.P.C., thus affecting the maintainability of revision under Section 397(1) Cr.P.C. The petitioners, accused in complaints under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, filed petitions during trial to send documents to experts to establish their defense. Trial Courts dismissed these petitions on factual grounds. Aggrieved, the petitioners filed Criminal Revision Cases under Section 397(1) Cr.P.C.

The petitioners contended that revisions are maintainable against intermediate orders, citing the Supreme Court's judgments in Amar Nath v. State of Haryana and Madhu Limaye v. The State of Maharashtra, which held that orders affecting the rights of the accused or deciding certain rights of the parties are intermediate orders, not interlocutory orders, thus making revisions maintainable. They argued that the right to seek expert examination of disputed documents is a substantial right affecting their defense, making the order an intermediate one.

Contrarily, the respondents and the Public Prosecutor argued that revisions under Section 397(1) Cr.P.C. are maintainable only against final orders terminating the proceedings, while interlocutory orders are barred under Section 397(2) Cr.P.C. They relied on the Supreme Court's judgment in Girish Kumar Suneja v. C.B.I., which clarified that only orders culminating the main proceedings are intermediate orders. They contended that orders under Section 45 of the Evidence Act do not terminate proceedings and thus are interlocutory orders, barring revisions under Section 397(2) Cr.P.C.

2. Determination of whether orders under Section 45 of the Evidence Act are interlocutory, intermediate, or quasi-final orders:

The Court analyzed the historical background and legislative intent behind Section 397(2) Cr.P.C., introduced in 1973 to curb delays caused by revisions against interlocutory orders. It emphasized that interpretation of statutes must align with legislative intent, avoiding dilution of the legislative objective. The Court noted that revisions are maintainable when no right of appeal is provided against a particular final order, and intermediate orders, which if reversed, terminate proceedings, also allow revisions.

The Court reiterated that orders under Section 45 of the Evidence Act, passed during trial, do not decide anything finally or terminate proceedings, making them pure interlocutory orders. The Court referred to precedents, including Amar Nath and Madhu Limaye, which introduced the concept of intermediate orders, and Girish Kumar Suneja, which clarified that orders terminating proceedings are intermediate orders. The Court emphasized that orders summoning witnesses or calling for documents, similar to orders under Section 45, are interlocutory orders, barring revisions under Section 397(2) Cr.P.C.

The Court concluded that orders under Section 45 of the Evidence Act are interlocutory orders, not intermediate or quasi-final orders, thus revisions against them are barred under Section 397(2) Cr.P.C. The Court dismissed all Criminal Revision Cases as not maintainable under law, closing any pending miscellaneous applications.