2013 (2) TMI 812 - HC - Customs

Jurisdiction - certification of correctness of inventory - conduct of proceedings under Section 110(1B) of the Customs Act, 1962 - Binding precedent or not - whether the functions must be performed by an Executive Magistrate or by a Judicial Magistrate? Held that - Since the task of certifying the correctness of the inventory in respect of seized goods under Section 110 (1B) of the Act is only an Executive function, in view of the provision of Section 3, sub-Section (4) of the Cr.P.C. the functions must be performed by an Executive Magistrate and not by a Judicial Magistrate. Since the aspect of function of the Magistrate as appearing under Section 110 (1B) under reference to the provision of Section 3 (4) Cr.P.C. was not examined in the orders relied upon by the learned counsel for the Petitioner, they cannot be said to be binding precedents. Rather, the same are per incuriam. The Petition is dismissed with liberty to the Petitioner to approach the Collector concerned of the area to perform the functions as laid down under Section 110 (1B) of the Act.

Summary

Issues:
1. Jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Magistrate to certify the correctness of inventory under Section 110(1B) of the Customs Act, 1962.

Detailed Analysis:

Issue 1: Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Magistrate
The Petitioner, Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (DRI), filed a petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure seeking directions for the Metropolitan Magistrate to hold court at a specific location for conducting proceedings under Section 110(1B) of the Customs Act, 1962. The case involved the seizure of prohibited Red Sanders wood, and the DRI requested certification of the inventory by the Magistrate. The question arose whether certifying the inventory falls within the judicial functions of a Magistrate or are merely administrative/executive in nature. The Court appointed an Amicus Curiae to assist in resolving this issue.

The Petitioner relied on previous judgments where the aspect of certifying the correctness of inventory prepared by customs officers was not thoroughly examined by the Single Judges. The Amicus Curiae argued that these functions are executive in nature and should be performed by an Executive Magistrate, not a Judicial Magistrate. Reference was made to Section 3(4) of the Cr.P.C., distinguishing between functions requiring judicial decisions and those of an administrative or executive nature. The Amicus Curiae cited a Gujarat High Court judgment emphasizing that certifying inventory under Section 110(1B) is an executive function, thus should be handled by an Executive Magistrate.

The Court agreed with the Amicus Curiae's interpretation, stating that the functions under Section 110(1B) are executive in nature and not within the purview of Judicial Magistrates. The Court dismissed the petition, advising the Petitioner to approach the Collector concerned to perform the functions specified under Section 110(1B) of the Act. The judgment highlighted the importance of clarifying such matters for Metropolitan Magistrates and directed the transmission of the order to the relevant authorities for information.

In conclusion, the judgment clarified the distinction between judicial and executive functions concerning certifying inventory under the Customs Act, emphasizing the need for Executive Magistrates to handle such tasks. The decision provided guidance for future cases involving similar issues and aimed to streamline the process for certifying seized goods in compliance with the law.