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Issues Involved:
1. Whether the landlords had the locus standi to be made parties in the writ of certiorari. 2. Whether the Government's order exempting the building under Section 13 of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1949, was a judicial act. 3. Whether the Government's order violated the fundamental rights of the petitioner under Article 14 and Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution of India. 4. Whether the Government acted with mala fides in exempting the building from the operation of the Act. Detailed Analysis: 1. Locus Standi of Landlords: The petitioner contended that the landlords had no locus standi to intervene in the writ proceedings. He argued that in a writ of certiorari, only the tribunal whose order is sought to be quashed is a necessary party. The court disagreed, stating that issuing writs without hearing the affected parties would violate principles of natural justice. It was held that the landlords, being directly affected by the Government's order, were proper parties to be heard. The court cited Rule 6 of the rules to regulate proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution, which allows the court to hear any person who appears to be a proper person to be heard in opposition to the petition. 2. Nature of the Government's Order: The landlords argued that the Government's order exempting the building under Section 13 of the Act was not a judicial act and thus not liable to be quashed in a writ of certiorari. The court examined Section 13, which grants the Government wide discretionary power to exempt buildings from the Act without following a prescribed judicial procedure. The court concluded that the Government's order was an administrative act, not a judicial act, as it did not involve a judicial approach or procedure. 3. Violation of Fundamental Rights: The petitioner claimed that the Government's order violated his fundamental rights under Article 14 and Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution. The court referred to a Bench decision which held that the Government, in exempting a house, did not violate any fundamental rights. The court emphasized that the petitioner had no fundamental right to remain in possession of the building indefinitely, and the rights he claimed were conferred by the Act itself. The court also discussed the principles laid down in 'Dr. N.B. Khare v. State of Delhi' and 'State of Madras v. V.G. Row', which require examining both substantive and procedural aspects of the law for reasonableness. The court held that Section 13 did not impose unreasonable restrictions on the petitioner's right to hold property, as the right was created by the statute and subject to its provisions. 4. Allegation of Mala Fides: The petitioner alleged that the Government acted with mala fides to circumvent the orders of the civil court. The court distinguished between the scope of enquiry before the tribunals constituted by the Act and the Government's power under Section 13. It noted that the Government's power to exempt a building was not limited by the provisions of the Act. The court reviewed the records and found that the Government's decision was likely influenced by the bona fide intention to protect the interests of landlords who had no other houses to live in. The court concluded that the petitioner failed to establish that the Government acted with mala fides. Conclusion: The court dismissed the application, holding that the landlords were proper parties to be heard, the Government's order was an administrative act, no fundamental rights of the petitioner were violated, and the Government did not act with mala fides. The application was dismissed with costs, and respondents were awarded an advocate's fee of Rs. 100.
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