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Issues Involved:
1. Applicability of the Employees' Provident Funds Act, 1952 to the petitioners' factory. 2. Definition and interpretation of "manufacture" and "textiles" under the Act. 3. Impact of the amendment to the Act on the petitioners' factory. Detailed Analysis: 1. Applicability of the Employees' Provident Funds Act, 1952 to the petitioners' factory: The petitioners sought a writ of mandamus under Article 226 of the Constitution to prevent the enforcement of the Employees' Provident Funds Act, 1952, as amended, against their factory. They argued that their factory, which processes woollen, silk, cotton, and rayon yarn textile goods by dyeing, printing, bleaching, and finishing, employing 150 workmen, does not fall within Schedule I of the Act read with Sections 2(i) and 4. They contended that they are neither manufacturers nor producers of textile goods, thus the notice from the opposite party dated 20-3-1954 was contrary to law, and they were not liable to comply with the Act's provisions. 2. Definition and interpretation of "manufacture" and "textiles" under the Act: The court examined the definitions and interpretations relevant to the Act. The Act's objective is to provide for the institution of provident funds for employees in factories and other establishments, applicable to all factories engaged in any industry specified in Schedule I with 50 or more employees. The term "manufacture" was defined by the amending Act 37 of 1953 as "making, altering, ornamenting, finishing or otherwise treating or adapting any article or substance with a view to its use, sale, transport, delivery or disposal." The court emphasized a beneficial construction of the statute to align with the welfare state policy and the directive principles of state policy in the Constitution. 3. Impact of the amendment to the Act on the petitioners' factory: The court noted that the amendment to the Act and Schedule I clarified the inclusion of various processes related to textiles, such as "carding, spinning, weaving, finishing and dyeing yarn and fabrics, printing, knitting and embroidering." The petitioners argued that the need for the amendment indicated that their factory was not originally covered by the Act. However, the court disagreed, stating that the amendment served to clarify the original intent rather than exclude the petitioners' factory from the Act's scope. The court interpreted "manufacture" broadly, including processes like dyeing, printing, and finishing as part of the textile manufacturing process. The court concluded that the petitioners' factory, engaged in these processes, falls within the definition of an industry engaged in the manufacture or production of textiles under the Act. Conclusion: The court dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioners' factory is covered by the Schedule of the un-amended Act, and the opposite party rightly called upon them to submit statements under the provisions of the Act. The rule was discharged with costs, and the petitioners were required to comply with the Act's provisions.
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