2013 (8) TMI 1045 - SC - Indian Laws

Recovery of Possession - Suit filed by a licensor against a gratuitous licensee under Section 41(1) of the Presidency Small Causes Courts Act, 1882 (the PSCC Ac), as amended by the Maharashtra Act No.XIX of 1976 (1976 Amendment Act) is maintainable before a Small Causes Court, Mumbai - Bombay Rents, Hotels and Lodging House Rates (Control) Act, 1947 (the Rent Act) - HELD THAT - In the instant case, the concept of licence and lease were dealt with by contemporary statutes - Indian Easement Act, Transfer of Property Act and Section 41 of the PSCC Act and, as already indicated, all those statutes were enacted in the year 1882. Therefore, Section 41(1) of the PSCC Act could not have been contemplated any other meaning of the term occupation with permission but only the permission as contemplated by Section 52 of the Indian Easements Act. The PSCC Act is a procedural law and as already indicated, the expression licensor and licensee or landlord and tenant used in Section 41 of the PSCC Act (as amended by Maharashtra Act No. XIX of 1976) relate to immovable property and Section 52 of the Indian Easements Act which defines a licence has an inseparable connection to immovable property and property law. Legislature was well aware of those contemporaneous statutes, that was the reason, why the expression licence as such has not been defined in the PSCC Act with the idea that the expression used in a contemporaneous statutes would be employed so as to interpret Section 41 of the PSCC Act. ONE UMBERALLA POLICY High Court has correctly noticed that the clubbing of the expression licensor and licensee with landlord and tenant in Section 41(1) of the PSCC Act and clubbing of causes relating to recovery of licence fee is only with a view to bring all suits between the landlord and tenant and the licensor and licensee under one umberalla to avoid unnecessary delay, expenses and hardship. The act of the legislature was to bring all suits between landlord and tenant and licensor and licensee whether under the Rent Act or under the PSCC Act under one roof. We find it difficult to accept the proposition that the legislature after having conferred exclusive jurisdiction in one Court in all the suits between licensee and licensor should have carved out any exception to keep gratuitous licensee alone outside its jurisdiction. The various amendments made to Rent Act as well the Objects and Reasons of the Maharashtra Act XIX of 1976 would clearly indicate that the intention of the legislature was to avoid unnecessary delay, expense and hardship to the suitor or else they have to move from the one court to the other not only on the question of jurisdiction but also getting reliefs. That the expression licensee in Section 41(1) of the PSCC Act would take a gratuitous licensee as well. The reason for such an interpretation has been elaborately discussed in the earlier part of the judgment. Looking from all angles in our view the expression licensee used in the PSCC Act does not derive its meaning from the expression licensee as used in Subsection (4A) of Section 5 of the Rent Act and that the expression licensee used in Section 41(1) is a term of wider import intended to bring in a gratuitous licensee as well. We are, therefore, in complete agreement with the reasoning of the Full Bench of the High Court. In such circumstances, the appeals lack merits and are, therefore, dismissed. There is no order as to costs. Golden Rule is that the words of a statute must be prima facie be given their ordinary meaning when the language or phraseology employed by the legislature is precise and plain. This, by itself proclaims the intention of the legislature in unequivocal terms, the same must be given effect to and it is unnecessary to fall upon the legislative history, statement of objects and reasons, frame work of the statute etc. Such an exercise need be carried out, only when the words are unintelligible, ambiguous or vague. Noscitur a sociis Principle - a word or phrase in an enactment must always be construed in the light of the surrounding text. .words and particularly general words, cannot be read in isolation; their colour and their content are derived from their context. Noscitur a sociis is merely a rule of construction and it cannot prevail in cases where it is clear that the wider words are intentionally used by the legislature in order to make the scope of the defined word correspondingly wider. Contemporenea Expositan is the best and most powerful law and it is a recognized rule of interpretation. PARI MATERIA - to be a right and duty to construe every word of a statute in its context and used the word context in its widest sense, including other statutes in pari materia . that when two pieces of legislation are of different scopes, it cannot be said that they are in pari materia. this Court held that the Rent Act 1947 and the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948 were not held to be the acts in pari materia, as they do not relate to the same person or thing or to same class of persons of things.

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Whether the expression "licensee" in Section 41(1) of the Presidency Small Causes Courts Act (PSCC Act) includes a gratuitous licensee.
2. Whether a suit by a licensor against a gratuitous licensee is maintainable before the Small Causes Court under Section 41 of the PSCC Act.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Whether the expression "licensee" in Section 41(1) of the Presidency Small Causes Courts Act (PSCC Act) includes a gratuitous licensee:

The Supreme Court examined the historical context and legislative intent behind the PSCC Act and related statutes. The PSCC Act, along with the Transfer of Property Act and the Easements Act, was enacted in 1882. The term "licensee" was not explicitly defined in the PSCC Act, suggesting that it should be interpreted broadly, including both gratuitous and non-gratuitous licensees.

The Court emphasized the principle of "noscitur a sociis," which means that a word should be interpreted in the context of surrounding words. However, it noted that this principle is not applicable when the legislative intent is clear and unambiguous. The Court found that the legislature intended for the term "licensee" in Section 41(1) to be broad enough to include gratuitous licensees, as evidenced by the legislative history and the need to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and jurisdictional issues.

The Court also referred to the principle of "contemporanea expositio," which suggests that statutes enacted around the same time should be interpreted consistently. The PSCC Act, the Easements Act, and the Transfer of Property Act were all enacted in 1882, and the term "licensee" should be understood in the context of these contemporaneous statutes.

The Court concluded that the term "licensee" in Section 41(1) of the PSCC Act includes gratuitous licensees, aligning with the legislative intent to streamline legal proceedings and avoid unnecessary delays and expenses.

2. Whether a suit by a licensor against a gratuitous licensee is maintainable before the Small Causes Court under Section 41 of the PSCC Act:

The Supreme Court addressed the jurisdictional issue by analyzing the amendments made to the PSCC Act in 1976. The amendments aimed to bring all suits between licensors and licensees, as well as landlords and tenants, under the jurisdiction of the Small Causes Court to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and jurisdictional disputes.

The Court noted that Section 41(1) of the PSCC Act, as amended, confers jurisdiction on the Small Causes Court to entertain and try all suits and proceedings between a licensor and licensee or a landlord and tenant relating to the recovery of possession of immovable property or the recovery of license fees or rent. This jurisdiction is irrespective of the value of the subject matter.

The Court emphasized that the legislative intent behind the 1976 Amendment was to provide a comprehensive and efficient legal framework for resolving disputes between licensors and licensees, including gratuitous licensees. The amendments were designed to prevent unscrupulous parties from using dilatory tactics to prolong legal proceedings and to ensure that all such disputes are resolved expeditiously by the Small Causes Court.

The Court concluded that a suit by a licensor against a gratuitous licensee is maintainable before the Small Causes Court under Section 41 of the PSCC Act, aligning with the legislative intent to provide a unified and efficient legal process for such disputes.

Conclusion:

The Supreme Court upheld the Full Bench decision of the Bombay High Court, affirming that the term "licensee" in Section 41(1) of the PSCC Act includes gratuitous licensees and that suits by licensors against gratuitous licensees are maintainable before the Small Causes Court. The appeals were dismissed, with no order as to costs.