1966 (8) TMI 72 - HC - Indian Laws

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Representation of parties under Section 36 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
2. Whether Section 36(2) is exhaustive regarding the right of an employer to be represented.
3. The right of an incorporated company to be represented in proceedings under the Act.
4. The right of audience and the delegation of the right to an agent.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Representation of parties under Section 36 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947:
The dispute centered around whether Sri K. S. Mehta, who frequently represented the Indian Hume Pipe Company, could continue to represent the company before the industrial tribunal despite objections from the workmen. The workmen argued that under Section 36(2) of the Act, only specific persons could represent an employer, and Mehta did not fall within those categories.

2. Whether Section 36(2) is exhaustive regarding the right of an employer to be represented:
The court found it difficult to accept the submission that Section 36(2) was exhaustive. The language of Section 36 was interpreted as extending rights rather than imposing restrictions. The court opined that the clauses under Section 36(2) were not intended to be exhaustive. The employer could be represented in any lawful manner not explicitly excluded by other laws or rules. The court emphasized that the right of an employer to appear in person, if applicable, was not included in the three clauses, indicating that Section 36(2) was not exhaustive.

3. The right of an incorporated company to be represented in proceedings under the Act:
The court noted that an incorporated company, not being a physical entity, could not appear in person and must act through an agent. The court highlighted that if Section 36(2) were deemed exhaustive, it would lead to absurd consequences, such as a company being compelled to engage a rival in business or being left without representation if the specified persons declined to appear. The court concluded that the intention of the legislature was not to restrict the employer's right of representation to the categories mentioned in Section 36(2).

4. The right of audience and the delegation of the right to an agent:
The court rejected the argument that the right of a litigant to be heard is a personal right incapable of delegation. The fundamental principle of natural justice was identified as ensuring a cause is heard, not necessarily by the litigant in person. The court cited precedents supporting the delegation of rights to an agent, provided there was no statutory limitation. The court also distinguished the policy of the Industrial Disputes Act from the Code of Civil Procedure, noting that Section 36 allowed for broader representation rights, including the right to plead.

Conclusion:
The court concluded that Section 36(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, was not exhaustive. Employers could seek representation by persons other than those specified in the section, subject to the tribunal's discretion under Section 11 of the Act to regulate its procedure. The tribunal's decision to allow Sri K. S. Mehta to represent the company was upheld, and the rule in the petition was discharged without any order as to costs.