2000 (9) TMI 1070 - HC - Indian Laws

Issues Involved:
1. Review of judgment and order dated 23rd April 1999.
2. Applicability of Section 21(1) of the Limitation Act, 1963 under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
3. Application of Civil Procedure Code (C.P.C.) to arbitration proceedings under the 1996 Act.
4. Applicability of rules made under the Arbitration Act, 1940 to the 1996 Act.
5. Interpretation of Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
6. Exclusion of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act, 1963 in the context of the 1996 Act.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Review of Judgment and Order Dated 23rd April 1999:
The petitioners sought a review of the judgment and order dated 23rd April 1999, which dismissed the chamber summons concerning amendments indicated in specific paragraphs. The court initially rejected the application to implead Haresh Melwani and held that Section 21(1) of the Limitation Act, 1963 could not expand the court's power regarding the condonation of delay under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

2. Applicability of Section 21(1) of the Limitation Act, 1963:
The petitioners argued that Section 21(1) of the Limitation Act, 1963, which deals with the effect of substituting or adding new plaintiffs or defendants, should apply to arbitration proceedings under the 1996 Act. They contended that the omission to make Haresh Melwani a party was a bona fide mistake, and the court should permit his addition as a party respondent. The court, however, noted that Section 21 applies to suits, and the term "suit" is specifically defined in the Limitation Act as not including an appeal or an application. Therefore, Section 21 would not apply to arbitration proceedings commenced by petitions under the 1996 Act.

3. Application of Civil Procedure Code (C.P.C.) to Arbitration Proceedings:
The petitioners contended that Section 141 of the C.P.C., which mandates that the procedure provided in the Code with regard to suits shall be followed in all proceedings in any court of civil jurisdiction, should apply to arbitration proceedings under the 1996 Act. The court, however, concluded that the 1996 Act is intended to be a self-contained code, and the provisions of the C.P.C. do not apply unless specifically made applicable by the 1996 Act.

4. Applicability of Rules Made Under the Arbitration Act, 1940:
The petitioners relied on Section 85(2)(b) of the 1996 Act, arguing that the rules made under the 1940 Act should continue to apply to the extent they are not repugnant to the provisions of the 1996 Act. The court rejected this contention, stating that the 1996 Act is a self-contained code, and the rules made under the 1940 Act do not apply to proceedings under the 1996 Act. The court highlighted that fresh rules (803A to 803F) have been made to govern proceedings under the 1996 Act.

5. Interpretation of Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996:
The court emphasized that Section 34(3) of the 1996 Act prescribes a limitation period of three months for filing an application to set aside an arbitral award, with an additional 30 days allowed for sufficient cause but not thereafter. This indicates the legislature's intention to expedite arbitration proceedings and exclude the application of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

6. Exclusion of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act, 1963:
The court noted that although the 1996 Act does not explicitly exclude Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act, the scheme of the 1996 Act suggests an intention to exclude these provisions. The court referred to judgments of the Supreme Court, which held that the exclusion of the Limitation Act's provisions need not be in express words but can be inferred from the scheme and nature of the special law.

Conclusion:
The court concluded that the 1996 Act is a self-contained code, and the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code and the Limitation Act, 1963, apply only to the extent specifically made applicable by the 1996 Act. The review petition was dismissed, and the petitioners were ordered to pay costs to the respondents.

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