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Issues Involved:
1. Whether the High Court in a writ proceeding can set aside an order of punishment if it is arbitrary, grossly excessive, or out of all proportion to the offence committed. 2. Whether the High Court can substitute any other punishment in place of the one imposed by the disciplinary authority. Issue-wise Detailed Analysis: 1. Whether the High Court in a writ proceeding can set aside an order of punishment if it is arbitrary, grossly excessive, or out of all proportion to the offence committed: The judgment begins by addressing the question of whether a High Court can interfere with the quantum of punishment imposed by a disciplinary authority if it finds the punishment to be arbitrary, grossly excessive, or out of all proportion to the offence committed. The court notes that previous decisions by two-judge benches of the Orissa High Court had allowed such interference, relying on Supreme Court decisions in Bhagatram v. State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 1983 SC 454, and Shankar Das v. Union of India, AIR 1985 SC 772. However, another bench of the Orissa High Court in Y. Venkatrao v. South-Eastern Railway, (1991) 71 Cut LT 512, disagreed with this view, citing the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Parma Nanda, AIR 1989 SC 1185, which held that the High Court does not have jurisdiction to impose any punishment to meet the ends of justice. The court also referred to the Constitution Bench decision in State of Orissa v. Bidya Bhusan Mohapatra, AIR 1963 SC 779, which stated that the High Court cannot interfere with the punishment once the misdemeanour is found and proved. The court further examines whether the observations in paragraph 127 of Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel, AIR 1985 SC 1416, which suggested that the High Court can substitute a punishment if it finds the original punishment to be arbitrary or grossly excessive, would apply to the present case. The court concludes that these observations were made in the context of Clause (a) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution and do not apply to cases where the punishment was imposed following a full-fledged departmental enquiry. 2. Whether the High Court can substitute any other punishment in place of the one imposed by the disciplinary authority: The court discusses the contention that the High Court can substitute a punishment if it finds the original punishment to be disproportionate, as suggested by the Supreme Court in Bhagatram's case. However, it notes that this view was not considered binding in Parma Nanda's case, which held that the High Court does not have the power to substitute a punishment, a power that the Supreme Court can exercise under Article 136 of the Constitution. The court also addresses the argument that the decision in Parma Nanda's case is per incuriam (given in ignorance of a binding authority) because it did not consider the observation in Bhagatram's case that disproportionate penalties violate Article 14 of the Constitution. The court rejects this argument, stating that the decision in Parma Nanda's case is not per incuriam as it did not ignore any binding authority or statutory provision. The judgment concludes that, based on the current state of law, the High Court does not have the jurisdiction to set aside a punishment awarded by the disciplinary authority, even if it finds the punishment to be arbitrary or grossly excessive, in cases where the punishment was imposed following a full-fledged enquiry. The court also notes that the power to pass orders to do "complete justice" is expressly conferred on the Supreme Court by Article 142 of the Constitution, and there is no similar provision for the High Courts. Separate Judgments: A.K. Padhi, J. and K.C. Jagadeb Roy, J. concurred with the judgment delivered by B. Hansaria, CJ, without delivering separate judgments.
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