2006 (2) TMI 682 - HC - Indian Laws

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Legality of the show-cause notice issued to the respondent.
2. Delay and laches in initiating disciplinary action.
3. Rights of an employer to initiate disciplinary proceedings.
4. Impact of previous court orders on the current disciplinary action.
5. Whether the respondent was given immunity from disciplinary action.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Legality of the Show-Cause Notice:
The intra-Court appeal by the appellant-Karnataka Silk Industries Corporation Limited challenges the order passed by the learned Single Judge, which directed the appellant not to proceed further with the show-cause notice dated 14-2-2005. The learned Single Judge interfered with the show-cause notice on the ground of delay and laches, stating, "the present show-cause notice is required to be interfered with on account of delay and laches and the respondents are to be directed not to proceed further on the basis of the said notice." The appellant contended that the learned Single Judge interfered on a ground neither pleaded nor argued by the respondent. The appellant argued that the right to initiate disciplinary proceedings should be respected and that the delay was not so significant as to warrant interference.

2. Delay and Laches in Initiating Disciplinary Action:
The learned Single Judge interfered with the show-cause notice primarily due to the delay in initiating action against the respondent. The respondent was initially discharged from service on 31-3-1994, reinstated on 6-11-1996, and again discharged on 23-8-1997 without holding an enquiry. The learned Single Judge in the previous writ petition directed reinstatement with full back wages and continuity of service. The appellant issued a fresh show-cause notice on 14-2-2005, which was challenged by the respondent. The learned Single Judge held that "delay is fatal in the case on hand" and directed the appellant not to proceed further. However, the Division Bench noted that the delay was not a ground taken by the respondent in the writ petition, and the appellant had no opportunity to explain the delay.

3. Rights of an Employer to Initiate Disciplinary Proceedings:
The Division Bench emphasized that an employer has the right to initiate disciplinary proceedings against an erring employee. The learned Single Judge himself observed that "the employer has every right to initiate disciplinary proceedings against an erring employee." The Division Bench held that the learned Single Judge should not have interfered with the show-cause notice at the stage of its issuance, as the matter was still at the preliminary stage of fact-finding to determine the suitability of the respondent for the post.

4. Impact of Previous Court Orders on the Current Disciplinary Action:
The respondent argued that the previous court orders gave a quietus to the disciplinary action against him. However, the Division Bench clarified that the earlier orders did not grant immunity from disciplinary action for all time to come. The charges against the respondent were never tested on merits, and the previous orders only set aside the discharge for non-compliance with the principles of natural justice. The Division Bench held that the right of the employer to initiate action could not be taken away by the court for all time to come.

5. Whether the Respondent Was Given Immunity from Disciplinary Action:
The Division Bench rejected the contention that the respondent was given immunity from disciplinary action. The impugned show-cause notice referred to omissions and commissions subsequent to the earlier orders. The Division Bench held that the learned Single Judge's interference with the show-cause notice on the ground of delay and laches was unwarranted, as the respondent was yet to be confirmed to the post and the charges were still to be tested.

Conclusion:
The Division Bench allowed the appeal, set aside the impugned order of the learned Single Judge, and directed the respondent to offer his explanation to the show-cause notice. The Bench emphasized that the enquiry should proceed, and any adverse order could be challenged before the Competent Authority. The appeal was allowed with no order as to costs.