2010 (2) TMI 1248 - SC - Indian Laws

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Constitutionality of Section 12 of the Delhi School Education Act, 1973.
2. Applicability of Section 8(2) of the Act to minority institutions.
3. Legality of the appellant's removal from service.
4. Proportionality of the punishment imposed on the appellant.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Constitutionality of Section 12 of the Delhi School Education Act, 1973:

The Division Bench of the Delhi High Court declared Section 12 of the Delhi School Education Act, 1973, ultra vires the Constitution insofar as it restricts its applicability to unaided minority institutions. The High Court held that any provision which seeks to take away the right of the managing committee to pass any order of dismissal, removal, or reduction in rank would be violative of Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India. However, this provision may be upheld if an independent Tribunal wholly unconnected with the affairs of the institution oversees compliance with the principles of natural justice. The Supreme Court noted that the High Court's negative declaration on the constitutionality of Section 12 was uncalled for, as the Supreme Court had already held in Frank Anthony Public School Employees' Association's case that Section 12, which excludes the applicability of Chapter IV of the Act to unaided minority institutions except Section 8(2), is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.

2. Applicability of Section 8(2) of the Act to Minority Institutions:

The Division Bench considered whether Section 8(2) of the Act, read with Rule 120(2) of the Rules, conferred unguided powers upon the Director to refuse to approve actions proposed by the management of recognized private educational institutions against their employees. The High Court held that Section 8(2) does not apply to minority institutions, as it confers unbridled and unguided power on the Director, which cannot be upheld. The Supreme Court reaffirmed the proposition that Section 8(2) interferes with the right of minorities to establish and administer their educational institutions and is, therefore, inapplicable to private recognized aided/unaided minority educational institutions.

3. Legality of the Appellant's Removal from Service:

The Tribunal had set aside the appellant's removal from service on the grounds of violation of Section 8(2) of the Act and Rule 120(2) of the Rules, as the management had not obtained the Director's permission before removing the appellant. The High Court set aside the Tribunal's order, indirectly restoring the order passed by the Chairman of the Managing Committee. The Supreme Court noted that the order of punishment was passed by the Chairman without complying with the mandate of the relevant statutory rule and the principles of natural justice, as the Chairman did not properly consider the appellant's representation. Therefore, the Supreme Court concluded that the order of punishment was vitiated due to the violation of statutory rules and principles of natural justice.

4. Proportionality of the Punishment Imposed on the Appellant:

The Supreme Court considered whether the penalty of removal from service was disproportionate to the misconduct found against the appellant. The Court noted that the extreme penalty of removal from service imposed on the appellant was not justified, as she was not found guilty of any serious misconduct. The Supreme Court substituted the punishment of removal from service with the penalty of stoppage of three increments without cumulative effect and directed that the appellant be paid 20% of back wages during the intervening period.

Conclusion:

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's order, and substituted the punishment of removal from service with the penalty of stoppage of three increments without cumulative effect. The Court also directed that the appellant be paid 20% of the salary and allowances for the period between her removal from service and the date of the order. Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 were directed to reinstate the appellant without delay. The parties were left to bear their own costs.