1969 (1) TMI 76 - HC - Indian Laws

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Default in payment of rent.
2. Applicability of Section 13-A of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950.
3. Interpretation of "appeal" within the meaning of Clause (d) of Section 13-A.
4. Reopening of proceedings under Section 13-A.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Default in Payment of Rent:
The plaintiff-landlord filed a suit for arrears of rent and ejectment against the defendants-tenants on the grounds of non-payment of rent for more than twelve months and personal necessity. The trial court rejected the personal necessity plea but decreed the suit for arrears of rent and ejectment due to default in payment. The Senior Civil Judge, Jaipur, on appeal, set aside this judgment, giving the defendants the benefit of Section 13(4) of the Act. The High Court, on further appeal, decreed the suit for ejectment solely on the ground of default in payment of rent.

2. Applicability of Section 13-A:
Section 13-A was inserted in the Act by the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Amendment Act No. 12 of 1965. The defendants applied under Clause (d) of Section 13-A, stating they had deposited the arrears of rent, interest, and costs, and requested the reopening of the decree passed on 8-4-1965. The plaintiff-landlord opposed this, arguing that the defendants' application for leave to appeal amounted to filing an appeal, thus disqualifying them from the benefits of Clause (d).

3. Interpretation of "Appeal":
The court examined whether an application for leave to appeal could be considered an "appeal" within the meaning of Clause (d) of Section 13-A. The learned single Judge initially held that the application for leave to appeal must be regarded as an "appeal," thereby disqualifying the defendants from the benefits of Clause (d). However, the appellate court disagreed, stating that an application for leave to appeal is merely a request for permission to file an appeal and cannot be considered an appeal itself.

4. Reopening of Proceedings:
The court emphasized that the legislative intent behind Section 13-A was to protect tenants from eviction by allowing them to pay arrears, interest, and costs. The court interpreted Clause (d) to mean that tenants against whom decrees for eviction had been passed on or after 21st March 1955 but before the commencement of the Amending Act, could apply for reopening the proceedings, regardless of whether they had filed an appeal or not. The court held that the defendants were entitled to make an application under Clause (d) and that their application should not have been dismissed on the ground that they had sought leave to appeal.

Conclusion:
The appeal was allowed, and the order of the learned single Judge was set aside. The case was remanded for disposal of the defendants' application under Section 13-A according to law. The court concluded that an application for leave to appeal cannot be regarded as an "appeal" within the meaning of Clause (d) of Section 13-A. The parties were directed to bear their own costs of the appeal.