2004 (1) TMI 709 - SC - Indian Laws

Validity of the cut off date fixed by the Bank for deciding the eligibility of its employees for promotion to the posts of Field Supervisors and Officers - Principle of seniority-cum-merit - backlog reserved for Scheduled Tribe Category - Procedure of dereservation - All India Backward Class Bank Employees Welfare Association ( Association ) - Promotees are employees of Marathwada Gramin Bank ( Bank ) - HELD THAT - It is not the contention of the Association that procedures for effecting promotion had not been followed. The promotees were admittedly eligible for promotion and they had thus legally been promoted. The only question which was raised related to compliance on the part of the Bank as regard the procedure of dereservation. The High Court therefore was required to consider the said question only in the event the factual foundation therefor had been laid down in the writ petition. The Association did not file even any supplementary affidavit or an application for amendment of the writ petition praying for a relief as regard quashing of the order of dereservation or bringing the appellants herein as parties thereto in the writ petition. In absence of any challenge to the order of dereservation and in absence of the Promotees having been impleaded as parties the impugned directions could not have been issued by the High Court more so when the appellants herein had not been given an opportunity of being heard. Once dereservation is made the vacancies became available for being filled up by general category candidates and thus therefor the respondent Bank was not required to reexamine the question of availability of the Scheduled Tribe candidates for appointment on dereserved vacancies. The view taken by the High Court that even after dereservation was made the Bank was required to reexamine the availability of ST candidates on the dereserved vacancies was therefore not correct particularly when the High Court itself found that the cut off date being 31.8.1989 was correctly fixed by the Bank. In the instant case the cut off date so fixed having regard to the directions contained by the National Industrial Tribunal which had been given a retrospective effect cannot be said to be arbitrary irrational whimsical or capricious. It is not in dispute that a cut-off date can be provided in terms of the provisions of the statute or executive order. An upshot of the discussions is that the High Court could not have issued the impugned directions in absence of the promotees having not been impleaded as parties. Furthermore the order of dereservation was not under challenge. In these appeals this Court is not concerned with the effect of the orders passed by the High court in the writ petitions filed by 13 Scheduled Tribe candidates. We must however notice that it has been stated at the Bar that the said writ petitions had been disposed of only relying on or on the basis of the impugned judgment. What would be the effect of the orders passed in the said writ petitions is not a matter which we have been called upon to determine. Suffice it however to point out that in relation to the said orders also the requisite consequences of setting aside the judgment of the High Court must ensue and it would be open to the High Court to pass appropriate orders in accordance with law in appropriate proceedings. As noticed hereinbefore the Bank had categorically stated that having regard to the changed situation they are not in a position to make any further promotions to the post of officers . This Court in the aforementioned situation cannot thus issue any directions upon the Bank to change its policy decision and accommodate the Scheduled Tribe candidates in violation of its own policy decision. It is for the Bank the Sponsor Bank as also NABARD to take an appropriate decision in this matter. Thus the impugned judgments of the High Court cannot be sustained which are set aside accordingly. Civil Appeal Nos. 4593-4594 and 4595-4596 of 2002 are allowed; whereas Civil Appeal No.4597 of 2002 is dismissed. No costs.

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the cut-off date for promotion eligibility.
2. Legality of the dereservation process.
3. Absence of necessary parties in the writ petitions.
4. Compliance with promotion procedures.

Summary:

Validity of the Cut-Off Date for Promotion Eligibility:
The High Court upheld the cut-off date of 31.8.1989 fixed by the Bank for deciding the eligibility of its employees for promotion to the posts of Field Supervisors and Officers. The Court found no questionable motive in fixing the cut-off date and deemed the explanation provided by the Bank as plausible. The High Court observed that even if the cut-off date was extended to 31.3.1990, no Scheduled Tribe candidate would have become eligible. The Supreme Court affirmed that the cut-off date was not arbitrary or unreasonable and did not violate Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

Legality of the Dereservation Process:
The High Court directed the Bank to examine the availability of Scheduled Tribe candidates for promotion from 18.4.1990 to 17.4.1993. However, the Supreme Court noted that the order of dereservation was not questioned in the writ petitions, and the High Court should not have delved into this issue. The Supreme Court emphasized that once dereservation is made, the vacancies become available for general category candidates, and the Bank was not required to reexamine the availability of Scheduled Tribe candidates for the dereserved vacancies.

Absence of Necessary Parties in the Writ Petitions:
The Supreme Court highlighted that the promotees were not impleaded as parties in the writ petitions, and neither the Union of India nor NABARD was questioned regarding the dereservation order. The absence of these necessary parties rendered the High Court's directions invalid. An order issued without giving an opportunity of hearing to the affected parties is bad in law.

Compliance with Promotion Procedures:
The Supreme Court acknowledged that the procedures for effecting promotion were followed, and the promotees were legally promoted. The only contention was regarding the compliance with the procedure of dereservation, which was not adequately addressed in the writ petitions. The High Court's directions to reexamine the availability of Scheduled Tribe candidates were deemed incorrect, especially when the cut-off date was correctly fixed.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court set aside the impugned judgments of the High Court due to the absence of necessary parties and the lack of challenge to the dereservation order. The appeals filed by the promotees were allowed, while the appeal by the Association was dismissed. The Court refrained from issuing directions to the Bank regarding the adjustment of both appellants and Scheduled Tribe candidates, leaving it to the Bank, Sponsor Bank, and NABARD to take appropriate decisions.