2017 (1) TMI 1531 - SC - Indian Laws

Offences punishable under Section 304B, 34 of the Indian Penal Code - acquittal of accused person - whether the learned trial judge had really pronounced the judgment of acquittal on 31.10.2007? - whether the High Court could have in exercise of its administrative power treated the trial as pending and transferred the same from the Court of Second Additional Sessions Judge, Ambikapur to the Court of District and Sessions Judge, Surguja at Ambikapur for rehearing and disposal? Held that - Chapter XVIII of CrPC provides for trial before a court of session. Section 227 empowers the trial judge to discharge the accused after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution and on being satisfied that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The key words of the Section are not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused - the sufficiency of ground would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the police or the documents produced before the court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame a charge against him. Though CrPC does not define the term judgment , yet it has clearly laid down how the judgment is to be pronounced. The provisions clearly spell out that it is imperative on the part of the learned trial judge to pronounce the judgment in open court by delivering the whole of the judgment or by reading out the whole of the judgment or by reading out the operative part of the judgment and explaining the substance of the judgment in a language which is understood by the accused or his pleader - as is evincible in the instant case, the judgment is not available on record and hence, there can be no shadow of doubt that the declaration of the result cannot tantamount to a judgment as prescribed in the CrPC. That leads to the inevitable conclusion that the trial in both the cases has to be treated to be pending. Jurisdiction - whether the High Court on its administrative side could have transferred the case from the Second Additional Sessions Judge, Ambikapur to the Court of District and Sessions Judge, Surguja at Ambikapur? - Held that - it is suffice to understand the jurisdiction and authority conferred under the Constitution on the High Court in the prescription of power of superintendence under Article 227 - Law is well settled by various decisions of this Court that the High Court can interfere under Article 227 of the Constitution in cases of erroneous assumption or acting beyond its jurisdiction, refusal to exercise jurisdiction, error of law apparent on record as distinguished from a mere mistake of law, arbitrary or capricious exercise of authority or discretion, a patent error in procedure, arriving at a finding which is perverse or based on no material, or resulting in manifest injustice. In the case at hand, the High Court on the administrative side had transferred the case to the learned Sessions Judge by which it has conferred jurisdiction on the trial court which has the jurisdiction to try the sessions case under CrPC. Thus, it has done so as it has, as a matter of fact, found that there was no judgment on record. There is no illegality. Be it noted, the Division Bench in the appeal preferred at the instance of the present appellants thought it appropriate to quash the order as there is no judgment on record but a mere order-sheet. In a piquant situation like the present one, we are disposed to think that the High Court was under legal obligation to set aside the order as it had no effect in law. When a situation like the present one crops up, it causes agony, an unbearable one, to the cause of justice and hits like a lightning in a cloudless sky. It hurts the justice dispensation system and no one, and we mean no one, has any right to do so. The High Court by rectifying the grave error has acted in furtherance of the cause of justice. The accused persons might have felt delighted in acquittal and affected by the order of rehearing, but they should bear in mind that they are not the lone receivers of justice. There are victims of the crime. Law serves both and justice looks at them equally. It does not tolerate that the grievance of the victim should be comatosed in this manner. Appeal dismissed.

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Whether the learned trial judge had really pronounced the judgment of acquittal on 31.10.2007.
2. Whether the High Court could have in exercise of its administrative power treated the trial as pending and transferred the same for rehearing and disposal.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Pronouncement of Judgment:
The judgment emphasizes the importance of judicial duty and the rule of law, stressing that courts must conduct proceedings with dignity, objectivity, and rationality, ultimately delivering a reasoned verdict. The case revolves around the alleged suicide of Ruby Singh, leading to the trial of her husband and in-laws under various sections of the IPC and Dowry Prohibition Act. The trial judge recorded an order of acquittal but did not provide a written judgment. A complaint revealed that no judgments were found in the records, prompting the High Court to investigate and suspend the trial judge. The High Court found that the trial judge had not dictated, dated, or signed any judgments, leading to the transfer of the cases for rehearing.

2. High Court’s Administrative Power:
The High Court's administrative decision to transfer the cases for rehearing was challenged by the accused, arguing that the trial judge's order amounted to a judgment and that the High Court could not transfer the case without an appeal. The Supreme Court analyzed the relevant provisions of the CrPC, emphasizing that a judgment must be pronounced in open court, signed, and dated. The absence of a complete and signed judgment meant that the trial could not be considered concluded. The Court ruled that the High Court had the authority under Article 227 of the Constitution to transfer the cases for rehearing, as the trial judge had not delivered a valid judgment.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision to transfer the cases for rehearing, emphasizing the necessity of a complete and signed judgment for a trial to be considered concluded. The Court dismissed the appeals, directing the trial court to proceed in accordance with the law. The judgment underscores the judiciary's responsibility to ensure fair trials and the proper administration of justice, protecting the interests of both the accused and the victims.