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Determining whether a person can be punished under Order 39 Rule 2-A of the Code of Civil Procedure for violating an interim injunction after the injunction has been vacated through final orders. Analysis: The judgment revolves around the question of whether a person can be punished under Order 39 Rule 2-A of the Code of Civil Procedure for violating an interim injunction after the injunction has been vacated through final orders. The case involved an appellant who obtained an interim injunction against the respondents, which was later vacated by the trial court. The appellant then sought to take action against the respondents for violating the injunction under Order 39 Rule 2-A. The District Judge dismissed the application, stating that no action could be taken as there was no subsisting injunction against the respondents. The appellant argued that there was no legal provision barring action under Order 39 Rule 2-A after the injunction had been vacated. On the other hand, the respondents contended that the purpose of the rule was to compel obedience to the injunction, and since the injunction no longer existed, punitive action could not be taken. The court examined the relevant provisions of Order 39, particularly Rule 2-A, which outlines the consequences of disobedience or breach of an interim injunction. The court analyzed the two consequences provided in Rule 2-A: attachment of property and detention in civil prison. It concluded that the primary punishment of attachment of property could not be awarded after the vacation of the interim order. The court further reasoned that the secondary punishment of detention in civil prison could not be justified if the substantive punishment could not be imposed. Additionally, the court highlighted that once the interim injunction was vacated, there was no basis for compelling obedience or enforcing the order. The judgment emphasized that the purpose of the provision was to ensure compliance with the order of injunction and not to serve the private interests of the party obtaining the injunction. It cited previous judgments, including one by the Supreme Court, to support the interpretation that punitive action could not be taken after the vacation of the injunction. The court dismissed the appeal, aligning with the spirit and purpose of the provision to compel obedience to court orders.
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