1980 (6) TMI 121 - HC - Indian Laws

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to applications under Section 504 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act.
2. Whether the Chief Judge of the Small Cause Court acts as a persona designate or as a Court.
3. Justification for condonation of delay in filing the application under Section 504 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act:
The appellant contended that the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act should apply to applications filed under Section 504 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act. The Court examined Section 504, which prescribes a one-year limitation period for filing such applications. The Court noted that Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act allows for the application of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act unless expressly excluded by the special or local law. Since there was no express exclusion of Section 5 in the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, the Court held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act does apply to applications under Section 504.

2. Persona Designate vs. Court:
The respondents argued that the Chief Judge of the Small Cause Court, while entertaining applications under Section 504, acts as a persona designate and not as a Court, thus exempting the application from Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The Court referred to the Supreme Court decision in Thakur Das v. State of Madhya Pradesh, which clarified that an authority acting in an official capacity as a presiding officer of a court is not a persona designate. The Court concluded that the Chief Judge of the Small Cause Court acts in his official capacity and not as an individual, thus functioning as a Court. Consequently, the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act are applicable.

3. Justification for Condonation of Delay:
The appellant argued that the delay in filing the application under Section 504 was due to the inaction of the Bombay Municipal Corporation, which did not respond to his compensation claim until 1st June 1968. The appellant believed there was no cause of action until the Corporation's reply was received. The Court emphasized that "sufficient cause" should be liberally construed to advance substantial justice, particularly when no negligence or inaction is attributable to the party seeking condonation. The Court found that the appellant had acted bona fide and had adequately explained the delay, which was primarily due to the Corporation's inaction and his honest belief that he could not file the application until the compensation dispute was raised.

Conclusion:
The Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the order of the Additional Chief Judge of the Small Cause Court, which had dismissed the application for condonation of delay. The Court directed the Small Cause Court to decide the application on merits in accordance with the law. The appeal was allowed without any order as to costs.