2011 (4) TMI 1127 - HC - Central Excise

Review applications - condonation of delay beyond 180 days - Amendment of Section 35-G., 2009 specifically confers power on the High Court to condone delay beyond the period of 180 days, if the High Court is satisfied that there is sufficient cause for not filing the same within the said period, in the case of VIP Industries Ltd. (2010 - TMI - 202571 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT - Central Excise), both the applications are allowed

Summary

Issues:
1. Condonation of delay in filing Appeals under Section 35-G of the Central Excise Act, 1944.
2. Interpretation of the statutory amendment in The Finance (No. 2) Act, 2009 regarding condonation of delay.
3. Review of impugned orders in light of the statutory amendment with retrospective effect.

Analysis:
1. The judgment deals with review applications arising from the dismissal of applications for condonation of delay in filing Appeals under Section 35-G of the Central Excise Act, 1944. The original applications were dismissed due to the absence of a provision for condonation of delay and the inability to resort to Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963.

2. The Applicant-Commissioner of Central Excise argued that the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2009 introduced an amendment to Section 35-G, allowing the High Court to admit an appeal after the expiry of 180 days if there was sufficient cause for the delay. This statutory amendment was deemed to be in effect from July 1, 2003.

3. The Commissioner relied on a previous Division Bench decision that supported the view that the statutory amendment provided grounds for the Court to review the impugned orders. The Respondent opposed the review applications, contending that the amendment did not empower the Court to review orders passed before the enactment of the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2009.

4. Upon hearing arguments from both parties, the Court found merit in the Applicant's submissions. The amendment now allowed for the condonation of delay beyond the 180-day period if sufficient cause was demonstrated. The Court referenced the specific provision in Section 108 of The Finance (No. 2) Act, 2009, which inserted sub-section (2)(a) with retrospective effect from July 1, 2003.

5. The Court, following the interpretation of the amendment in a previous case, allowed the review applications, citing the clear statutory provision that now empowered the High Court to condone delays beyond the stipulated period.

6. The Court distinguished a previous decision concerning the maintainability of a review petition under a different Act, emphasizing that the case at hand involved a question of review in light of the statutory amendment with retrospective effect.

7. Consequently, the Court allowed both applications, recalling the judgment and restoring the Miscellaneous Civil Applications for further proceedings.