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Issues Involved:
1. Compliance with Section 151 requirements. 2. Applicability of Section 147(b). 3. Presence of jurisdictional facts for invoking Section 147(a). Issue-wise Detailed Analysis: 1. Compliance with Section 151 Requirements: The petitioner contended that the impugned notice did not satisfy the requirements of Section 151 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Specifically, it was argued that both the approval of the Board and the Commissioner were necessary for issuing a notice under Section 147/148 after eight years. However, the court clarified that Section 151 requires only the Board's approval if the reopening is sought after eight years, not both the Board and the Commissioner. The court stated, "Once the approval of the Board is obtained, there is no question of obtaining the approval of the Chief Commissioner or Commissioner over again." Thus, the first contention was rejected. 2. Applicability of Section 147(b): The petitioner argued that Section 147(b) was not applicable, and thus the notice was barred by limitation. The court agreed that if the notice were under Section 147(b), it would indeed be time-barred as the limitation period is four years. However, the court noted that the impugned notice should be treated under Section 147(a) since the income alleged to have escaped assessment was more than fifty thousand rupees, allowing reopening within sixteen years. The court stated, "The impugned notice shall, therefore, be deemed to be one issued under clause (a) of section 147 only." Therefore, the second contention was also rejected. 3. Presence of Jurisdictional Facts for Invoking Section 147(a): The petitioner claimed that the jurisdictional facts necessary to invoke Section 147(a) were not present. The court held that the Tribunal's order in D. P. Kanaudia's appeal, particularly para 9, constituted relevant and adequate material for the Assessing Officer to believe that there was an omission or failure to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for assessment. The court emphasized, "Whether indeed there has been such omission or failure and whether it has led to income escaping assessment are matters to be finally decided in proceedings yet to be taken in pursuance of the impugned notice." Thus, the third contention was also rejected. Conclusion: The writ petition was dismissed as the court found no illegality in the initiation of proceedings under Sections 147/148. The court concluded that the Tribunal's observations provided sufficient grounds for the Assessing Officer to believe that income had escaped assessment due to the petitioner's failure to disclose all material facts fully and truly. The decision emphasized the legal principle that the Board's approval suffices for reopening assessments after eight years, and the material from the Tribunal's order was adequate for invoking Section 147(a).
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