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Issues Involved:
1. Joint trial of the vendor, distributor, and manufacturer for offences under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. 2. Scope of Section 20A of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. 3. Legality and validity of the trial and charge against the appellant firm and its partner. Issue-wise Detailed Analysis: 1. Joint Trial of the Vendor, Distributor, and Manufacturer: The Full Bench of the Delhi High Court addressed whether a joint trial of the vendor, distributor, and manufacturer for offences under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, is illegal. The High Court held that the general procedure for joint trials, as found in Sections 234 to 239 of the Criminal Procedure Code, applies to prosecutions under the Act, which contains no special procedure for the joinder of charges or accused persons in the same trial. The joint trial of the vendor Laxmi Narain with the warrantor Jagdish Chander was permissible because the actions of both accused formed parts of the same transaction, as explained by the Supreme Court in the State of Andhra Pradesh v. Cheemalapati Rao and Anr. The High Court emphasized that mens rea is not an essential element for offences under the Act, and proof of a guilty mind is not necessary in statutes creating absolute liability for offences against public health and welfare. The High Court also noted that Section 19(3) of the Act confers a right upon the vendor, not the warrantor, and no interests of an accused person were prejudicially affected by a joint trial. 2. Scope of Section 20A of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954: The Full Bench held that Section 20A, which is an exception to Section 351(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code, can be invoked after the trial of the vendor has commenced and before it has concluded, but not after that. Section 20A is a self-contained provision, and the "person concerned in the offence" mentioned therein is not to be equated with "a person who has committed the same offence" mentioned in Section 239 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The High Court clarified that the addition of an accused under Section 20A constitutes an expressly laid down exception to the requirement of a sanction under Section 20(1) of the Act. 3. Legality and Validity of the Trial and Charge: The Supreme Court considered whether the charge against the appellant firm should be quashed due to the joint trial with Laxmi Narain. The Court held that a distributor could be prosecuted for selling adulterated food under Section 7 of the Act, and the definition of "sale" includes every kind of seller. The Court emphasized that Section 14 of the Act does not carve out an exemption for distributors or manufacturers who sell adulterated food. The Court also rejected the reasoning that a distributor or manufacturer could only be brought in subsequently after a warranty set up under Section 19(2) had been substantiated. The Court agreed with the Delhi High Court that the special provisions of Sections 19(2), 20, and 20A do not derogate from the effect of the ordinary provisions of the law, which enable separate and joint trials of accused persons. The Supreme Court noted that the activities of the manufacturer, distributor, and retail seller are sufficiently connected by a unity of purpose and design to make their joint trial possible in suitable cases. However, where a joint trial is likely to jeopardize a fair trial, a separate trial should be ordered. The Court concluded that the joint trial of the appellant with Laxmi Narain was not illegal, but the continuation of the prosecution would impose undue hardship on the appellant due to the passage of time and the difficulty in defending against the stale charge. Consequently, the Court quashed the charge against the appellant and ordered his discharge. Separate Judgment by A. Alagiriswami, J.: Justice Alagiriswami agreed with the final conclusions and order proposed by his learned brothers but emphasized that for a joint trial of the vendor, distributor, and manufacturer to be valid, it must be alleged that the food was adulterated at every stage of manufacture, distribution, and sale. The absence of an allegation that the ghee distributed by the appellant to the vendor was adulterated means that both cannot be tried together. The validity of the charge depends on the facts put forward as the prosecution case, and without the necessary allegation, there cannot be a unity of purpose or common object to sell adulterated food.
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