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Issues Involved:
1. Whether the petitioner, as an apprentice, qualifies as a workman under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946. 2. The validity and acceptability of the petitioner's date of birth as recorded in various documents. 3. The applicability of principles of natural justice in the petitioner's case. Summary of Judgment: Issue 1: Whether the petitioner, as an apprentice, qualifies as a workman under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946. The petitioner argued that under the Standing Orders framed by the respondent u/s 7 of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, his date of birth should be recognized as September 10, 1959. The respondent contended that an apprentice is not a workman within the meaning of the Act and must provide proof of age before joining. The court examined the definitions and provisions under both the Apprenticeship Act, 1961, and the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946. It concluded that an apprentice under the Apprenticeship Act is not a workman, as per Section 18 of the Apprenticeship Act. Issue 2: The validity and acceptability of the petitioner's date of birth as recorded in various documents. The petitioner claimed his date of birth was September 10, 1959, supported by school certificates. However, the respondent produced a letter from the West Bengal Board of Secondary Education indicating the date of birth as September 1, 1957. The court noted that the petitioner did not provide his Matriculation Certificate at the time of appointment and relied on certificates from the school headmaster, which are admissible but not conclusive under Section 35 of the Evidence Act. The court found discrepancies in the petitioner's documents and concluded that the date of birth recorded by the respondent during the apprenticeship was not sacrosanct. Issue 3: The applicability of principles of natural justice in the petitioner's case. The petitioner argued that the respondent's actions violated principles of natural justice. The court held that suppression of material documents amounts to fraud, which vitiates all solemn acts. Therefore, principles of natural justice do not apply in cases involving fraud. The court emphasized that the petitioner must provide proof of his date of birth as per the Certified Standing Order, and the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 cannot be used to bypass statutory requirements. Conclusion: The court dismissed the appeal, stating that the petitioner must comply with the Certified Standing Order to prove his date of birth. The court also noted that the respondent, being a State entity, should act as a model employer and pass necessary orders regarding the petitioner's joining if no statutory bar exists. The appeal was dismissed with no order as to costs.
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