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Issues Involved:
1. Whether "Sharbat Rooh Afza" is a foodstuff or a medicinal product. 2. Whether "Sharbat Rooh Afza" falls within the scope of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 and the Fruit Products Order, 1955. 3. Whether the impugned order contravenes the fundamental rights of the appellants under Article 19(1)(f) & (g) of the Constitution. 4. Whether the Fruit Products Order, 1955 is valid and constitutional. 5. Whether the impugned order affects the appellants' trade-mark rights. Issue-wise Analysis: 1. Whether "Sharbat Rooh Afza" is a foodstuff or a medicinal product: The appellants claimed that "Sharbat Rooh Afza" is a medicinal product intended for common ailments and not a foodstuff. They argued that it cannot be regulated under the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. The respondents contended that the product is sold as a fruit product and not for medicinal purposes, noting that the bottles do not bear labels indicating "for medicinal use only." The Punjab High Court found that the product was neither prepared nor sold as a medicinal product, as the labels did not comply with clause 16(i)(c) of the Fruit Order, which requires medicinal products to be clearly marked as such. 2. Whether "Sharbat Rooh Afza" falls within the scope of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 and the Fruit Products Order, 1955: The appellants argued that "Sharbat Rooh Afza" is not an essential commodity and thus not subject to the Act or the Fruit Order. The High Court rejected this argument, stating that the product falls within the definition of "fruit product" under clause 2(d)(v) of the Fruit Order. The Supreme Court agreed, noting that the product contains fruit juices and falls within the purview of clause 2(d)(v) of the Fruit Order, which includes beverages containing fruit juices or pulp. 3. Whether the impugned order contravenes the fundamental rights of the appellants under Article 19(1)(f) & (g) of the Constitution: The appellants contended that the impugned order violated their fundamental rights to property and to practice any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade, or business. The High Court held that the restrictions imposed by the Fruit Order were reasonable and in the interest of the general public. The Supreme Court concurred, finding that the restrictions were justified and did not violate the appellants' fundamental rights. 4. Whether the Fruit Products Order, 1955 is valid and constitutional: The appellants challenged the validity of the Fruit Order, arguing that it was not issued in compliance with the condition precedent prescribed by section 3(1) of the Act, which requires the Central Government to form an opinion that it is necessary or expedient to regulate the production of an essential commodity. The Supreme Court did not allow this argument to be raised for the first time on appeal, noting that the respondents would have had the opportunity to address it if raised earlier. The Court also held that the Fruit Order was valid, as it aimed to regulate the qualitative production of essential commodities, which falls within the purview of section 3(1) of the Act. 5. Whether the impugned order affects the appellants' trade-mark rights: The appellants argued that the impugned order affected their trade-mark rights. The Supreme Court found this argument unconvincing, stating that compliance with the Fruit Order's requirements did not compel the appellants to change their trade-mark. The Court noted that if the appellants wanted to market the product without meeting the 25% fruit juice requirement, they could do so by labeling it as a "synthetic" product, as per clause 11(2) of the Fruit Order. The incidental impact on trade-mark rights did not render the impugned order invalid, as the restrictions were reasonable and in the public interest. Conclusion: The Supreme Court upheld the Punjab High Court's decision, dismissing the appellants' writ petition and affirming the validity of the impugned order and the Fruit Products Order, 1955. The appeal was dismissed with costs.
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