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Issues Involved:
1. Whether the payee or holder in due course of a dishonoured cheque can validly initiate prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, with reference to a second cause of action if he had not taken advantage of the first cause of action. 2. Whether successive causes of action for prosecution can arise on the basis of one and the same cheque. 3. Whether the decision in Kumaresan's case (1991 (1) Ker LT 893) was correctly decided. Detailed Analysis: Issue 1: Validity of Initiating Prosecution Based on Second Cause of Action The court examined whether the payee or holder in due course of a dishonoured cheque can initiate prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, with reference to a second cause of action if the first cause of action was not utilized. The court held that there is no express provision in Chapter XVII of the Act that precludes the payee or holder in due course from presenting the cheque again and issuing a notice of demand under clause (b) of the proviso to Section 138, thus creating a fresh cause of action. The court noted that the right to prosecute is an optional remedy and can be waived or renounced by the payee or holder in due course. The court emphasized that the payee or holder in due course does not forfeit the right to prosecute the offender based on a subsequent cause of action even if the first cause of action was not utilized. Issue 2: Successive Causes of Action for Prosecution The court addressed whether successive causes of action for prosecution can arise on the basis of one and the same cheque. The court found that the provisions of Chapter XVII of the Act do permit the creation of successive causes of action during the period of the validity of the cheque. The court reasoned that so long as the cheque remains unpaid, the payee or holder in due course can present the cheque again, and if it is dishonoured, issue a fresh notice of demand. If the drawer fails to satisfy the demand, a fresh cause of action arises, and the payee or holder in due course can file a complaint based on this new cause of action. The court concluded that the wording of Section 138 is wide enough to permit the creation of successive causes of action. Issue 3: Reconsideration of Kumaresan's Case The court reconsidered the decision in Kumaresan's case, which held that more than one cause of action on the same cheque is not contemplated or envisaged by the provisions of the Act. The court disagreed with this conclusion, stating that there is nothing in the provisions of Chapter XVII of the Act or its object and scheme that supports such a conclusion. The court found that the provisions do not justify the conclusion that more than one cause of action on the same cheque is not contemplated. The court emphasized that the view taken in Kumaresan's case is not correct and that the provisions of Section 138 and 142 of the Act permit the creation of successive causes of action. The court approved the view taken in Mahadevan Sunilkumar v. Bhadran (1991 (1) Ker LT 651) as correct. Conclusion: The court concluded that Kumaresan's case was not correctly decided and that there is nothing in Chapter XVII of the Act that precludes the creation of successive causes of action on the basis of one and the same cheque. The court held that Section 142(b) only prescribes a period of limitation for filing a complaint with reference to a cause of action already accrued and does not bar the payee or holder in due course from taking necessary actions to complete a fresh cause of action. The court dismissed the Criminal Miscellaneous Case, stating that successive causes of action may arise on the basis of one and the same cheque for filing a complaint under Section 142, subject to the restrictions contained in Sections 138 and 142 of the Act.
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