2003 (8) TMI 563 - SC - Indian Laws

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Whether the High Court of Delhi acted within the framework of law in exercising power under Section 433(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
2. The appropriateness of the High Court's decision to commute the sentence of imprisonment to a fine.
3. The exclusive domain of the executive versus judicial powers in commuting sentences.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Framework of Law under Section 433(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973:
The primary issue in this appeal was whether the High Court of Delhi acted within the legal framework in exercising powers under Section 433(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The respondent was found guilty under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment and fines. The High Court did not challenge the conviction but focused on the quantum of the sentence, suggesting an enhancement of the fine to commute the imprisonment. The Supreme Court noted that the power to commute sentences under Section 433 is an executive discretion and not within the judiciary's domain.

2. Appropriateness of Commuting Sentence to Fine:
The High Court, considering the respondent's prolonged trial and impending retirement, directed an enhancement of the fine to Rs. 15,000/- in commutation of the imprisonment. It recommended the State Government to formalize the commutation under Section 433(c). The Supreme Court emphasized that the power to commute a sentence is vested exclusively with the appropriate Government, not the judiciary. The High Court's direction to commute the sentence was beyond its jurisdiction, as it could only recommend consideration by the Government, not order commutation.

3. Executive vs. Judicial Powers in Commuting Sentences:
The Supreme Court reiterated that the power to commute sentences is an executive function, as per Sections 432 and 433 of the Code, and Articles 72 and 161 of the Constitution, which vest such powers in the President and Governors, respectively. The judiciary's role is limited to recommending consideration for commutation, not executing it. The Supreme Court referenced previous judgments, including Delhi Administration vs. Madan Lal and State of Punjab v. Kesar Singh, affirming that the High Court cannot exercise executive discretion in commuting sentences. The bench highlighted that the powers under Section 433 must be exercised reasonably, considering societal and public interests.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order, underscoring that the judiciary cannot usurp the executive's exclusive power to commute sentences. The respondent retains the right to seek relief from the appropriate Government, which holds the discretion to exercise commutation powers in accordance with the law. The appeal was allowed to the extent indicated, maintaining the separation of powers between the judiciary and the executive.