1970 (12) TMI 94 - HC - Indian Laws

Summary

Issues:
Condoning delay in filing appeal under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

Detailed Analysis:

Issue: Condoning delay in filing appeal under Section 5 of the Limitation Act

The case involved a petitioner who obtained a money decree against the opposite party in a money suit. The opposite party filed an appeal against the decree 23 days beyond the prescribed period of limitation. The Additional District Judge condoned the delay based on the ground that the records of the case and certified copies of the judgment and decree were received late, causing an oversight in sending them to the Government Pleader on time. The petitioner challenged this decision, arguing that no sufficient cause was shown for the delay and that the period between the last day prescribed for filing the appeal and the actual filing date was not explained.

The Court emphasized that in condoning delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, a legal right accrued to the decree-holder should not be disturbed without sufficient cause. The key consideration was whether the opposite party had shown sufficient cause in their application to justify the delay. The Court referred to previous decisions emphasizing a liberal construction of the term "sufficient cause" to advance substantial justice where no negligence or lack of bona fides was evident on the part of the appellant.

The Court highlighted that the party seeking to condone the delay must explain the entire period between the last day prescribed for filing the appeal and the actual filing date. In this case, the Court found that there was a lack of justification for the delay, as no detailed explanation was provided for the delay beyond the prescribed period of limitation. The Court noted the absence of relevant materials or efforts to explain each day's delay beyond the limitation period.

Ultimately, the Court concluded that no sufficient cause was demonstrated in the present case, and the lower Appellate Court had improperly exercised its discretion in condoning the delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The Court held that the discretion was not exercised judicially and set aside the impugned order of the Additional District Judge, emphasizing the importance of proving sufficient cause as a condition precedent for the Court to exercise discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

In conclusion, the Court made the Rule absolute, setting aside the order of the Additional District Judge and highlighting the duty of the Second Appellate Court to ensure the proper exercise of discretion in such matters.