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Issues Involved:
1. Retrospective application of the amended limitation period to suits instituted before the amendment. 2. Application of the new limitation rule to cases at the appeal stage. Issue-wise Detailed Analysis: 1. Retrospective Application of the Amended Limitation Period: The primary question was whether the alteration made by Section 32 of the U.P. Tenancy (Amendment) Act (X of 1947) in the period of limitation for a suit under Section 180 of the U.P. Tenancy Act governs suits instituted before the enactment came into force. The suit in question was filed on 2-1-1943 for possession and recovery of damages. The trial court dismissed the suit, but the District Judge on appeal remanded the case for a finding on the plaintiff's possession within limitation. The defendant contended that the plaintiff had lost his right to the property before the U.P. Tenancy Act came into force due to the one-year limitation period under the Oudh Rent Act. However, the lower appellate court held that the plaintiff had a period of 12 years limitation for his suit, and the suit was within time as per the U.P. Tenancy Act. During the pendency of the appeal, the U.P. Tenancy Act was amended, reducing the limitation period from 3 years to 2 years. The key issue was whether this amendment applied retrospectively to suits pending at the time of its enactment. The court analyzed Section 31 of the Amending Act, which states that all pending proceedings, suits, appeals, and revisions shall be decided in accordance with the amended provisions. It was emphasized that rules of limitation should be strictly construed and normally statutes are not to be given retrospective effect unless explicitly stated. However, Section 31 explicitly made the amendment retrospective, affecting pending suits and appeals. The court concluded that Section 31 is retrospective in operation, and pending proceedings are to be decided based on the amended law. The court cited multiple decisions supporting this interpretation and concluded that the amendment applies to pending suits. 2. Application of the New Limitation Rule to Cases at the Appeal Stage: The second question was whether the new rule of limitation could be applied to cases that had reached the stage of appeal. The court discussed the principle that an appellate court has the power to take into account changes in the law made subsequent to the trial court's decree. The hearing of an appeal is in the nature of a re-hearing, and the appellate court is entitled to consider legislative changes that occur after the trial court's decision. The appellate court is not merely a court of error but a court of rehearing, and the decree or order of the trial court merges into the decree or order of the appellate court. Therefore, the appellate court must decide the case based on the amended law of limitation. The court rejected the argument that the appellate court's function is only to see if the trial court's decision was correct based on the law at the time of the decision. The court emphasized that where the law explicitly states that appeals are to be decided according to the amended law, the appellate court must comply. The court referred to the Federal Court's decision in Lachmeshwar Prasad Shukul v. Keshwar Lal, which held that appellate courts must consider legislative changes that occur after the trial court's decision. In conclusion, the court answered both questions affirmatively, stating that the amended limitation period applies to suits pending at the time of the amendment and that the new limitation rule also applies to cases at the appeal stage. The judgment was agreed upon by all the judges involved.
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