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Issues Involved:
1. Retrospective Penalty under Section 69A of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932. 2. Compliance with Maharashtra State Amendment Act, 29 of 1984. 3. Interpretation of "may" and "shall" in legal context. 4. Applicability of penal statutes retrospectively. Summary: Issue 1: Retrospective Penalty under Section 69A of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 The petitioners challenged the orders dated 25th April 2005 and 12th October 2004, passed by the Registrar of Firms, Maharashtra State, Mumbai, u/s 69A of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, as amended by the Maharashtra Amendment Act, 29 of 1984. The orders imposed a retrospective penalty of Rs. 1,03,680/- for non-intimation of alterations in the partnership deeds dated 17-4-1972, 21-8-1975, and 18-10-1979. Issue 2: Compliance with Maharashtra State Amendment Act, 29 of 1984 The petitioners argued that prior to the Maharashtra State Amendment effective from 1-1-1985, there was no mandatory requirement to intimate changes within a specified period. The amendment introduced a mandatory 90-day period for intimation of changes, and penalties for non-compliance were introduced u/s 69A. The court noted that the amendment aimed to ensure prompt compliance and keep records up-to-date. Issue 3: Interpretation of "may" and "shall" in legal context The court highlighted that prior to the amendment, the term "may be sent" was used, indicating that intimation was not mandatory. The amendment changed this to "shall be sent," making it obligatory to send intimation within 90 days. The court emphasized that the word "may" generally does not mean "must" or "shall," but in the context of the amendment, it became mandatory. Issue 4: Applicability of penal statutes retrospectively The court ruled that the Maharashtra State Amendment does not have retrospective effect. Therefore, penalties cannot be imposed for actions or non-actions that occurred before the amendment came into force on 1-1-1985. The court cited various legal principles and precedents, including the Apex Court's observations, to support the view that penal statutes should be interpreted prospectively unless explicitly stated otherwise. Conclusion: The court quashed and set aside the impugned orders dated 12th October 2004 and 25th April 2005, declaring the demand for penalty based on changes effected prior to 1-1-1985 as illegal and without jurisdiction. The petition was allowed in terms of prayer Clause (a), and the respondents were directed to reconsider the issue and pass an appropriate order after hearing the petitioners, in accordance with the law. No order as to costs.
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