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Issues Involved:
1. Legislative competence. 2. Violation of the commerce clause under Article 301 of the Constitution. 3. Infringement of the fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. Detailed Analysis: 1. Legislative Competence: The primary issue was whether the West Bengal Entertainment-cum-Amusements Tax Act, 1982, was within the legislative competence of the State Legislature. The writ petitioner argued that the subject matter of the statute was covered by Entry 31 of List I (Union List), which pertains to "Posts and telegraphs; telephones, wireless, broadcasting and other like forms of communication." The petitioner contended that television, being a form of communication, falls under this entry, making Parliament the exclusive legislative authority. However, the court held that Entry 31 is a general entry and does not confer the power of taxation. The power to tax must be derived from specific taxing entries. The court emphasized that the State Legislature's power to levy taxes on luxuries, including entertainments and amusements, is derived from Entry 62 of List II (State List), which includes "Taxes on luxuries, including taxes on entertainments, amusements, betting and gambling." The court concluded that the impugned Act, in pith and substance, levies a tax on luxuries within the meaning of Entry 62 of the State List. The ownership or possession of a television set, which is not a necessity of life but a luxury, creates the liability to pay the tax. 2. Violation of the Commerce Clause under Article 301: The learned single judge had declared that the impugned Act violated Article 301 of the Constitution, which guarantees freedom of trade, commerce, and intercourse throughout the territory of India. The judge held that television is a form of intercourse and that the tax impeded this intercourse, thus infringing Article 301. The appellate court disagreed with this finding. It clarified that the tax was not on the telecast program but on the holder of the television set. The court emphasized that the subject matter of the tax is determined by the charging provision, which in this case, is the ownership or possession of the television set, not the activity of telecasting programs. The court further held that even if the tax was considered to be on the program, it did not impede the free intercourse of the telecast program. The transmission of the telecast begins and ends virtually at the same moment because it travels through the atmosphere with the speed of electricity. The impugned tax has no relevance to the movement or intercourse of the program. The court also noted that under Article 301, there should be a direct and immediate restriction on the movement of goods. An indirect or remote effect is immaterial. The impugned tax did not directly impede the free intercourse of the program. 3. Infringement of the Fundamental Right under Article 19(1)(a): The writ petitioner argued that the impugned tax infringed the fundamental right to acquire information under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution, as it imposed an unreasonable restriction. The court rejected this submission, stating that the direct operation of the Act upon the fundamental right forms the real test. Indirect or ancillary effects are immaterial and irrelevant. The petitioner failed to show how the imposition of the tax directly affected the freedom of speech and expression. The court held that the requirement to pay an annual tax for using the television set is, at best, an indirect or remote effect and does not constitute a restriction on the fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a). Conclusion: The appeal was allowed, and the judgment of the learned single judge was set aside. The writ petition was dismissed. The court concluded that the impugned Act was within the legislative competence of the State Legislature, did not violate Article 301 of the Constitution, and did not infringe the fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a).
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