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Issues Involved:
1. Interpretation of Clause (g) of Section 13-D of the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916. 2. Timing of Disqualification under Clause (g). 3. Compliance with Sections 166 and 168 of the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916. Detailed Analysis: 1. Interpretation of Clause (g) of Section 13-D of the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916: The primary issue in this case was the interpretation of Clause (g) of Section 13-D of the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916, which states that a person shall be disqualified for being chosen as a member of a board if he is in arrears in the payment of municipal tax or other dues in excess of one year's demand to which Section 166 applies. The appellant argued that the disqualification should only apply if the arrears were outstanding on the date of the poll. However, the court held that the disqualification applies if the arrears existed on the date of nomination, as the process of choosing a candidate begins with the filing of nominations. 2. Timing of Disqualification under Clause (g): The appellant contended that the relevant date for determining disqualification should be the date of the poll, not the date of nomination. The court rejected this argument, stating that the disqualification attaches at any stage of the election process, starting from the nomination. The court referred to previous judgments, including Chatturbhuj Vithaldas Jasani v. Moreshwar Parashram and Others and N. P. Ponnuswami v. The Returning Officer, Namakkal Constituency and Others, which established that disqualification at the time of nomination precludes a candidate from being chosen. The court emphasized that the election process is continuous and includes several stages, with nomination being a crucial part. 3. Compliance with Sections 166 and 168 of the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916: The appellant argued that since no bill was presented to him, nor was he served with a demand notice as required by Sections 166 and 168 of the Act, he should not be disqualified. Section 166 mandates the presentation of a bill for any sum on account of a tax, while Section 168 requires a notice of demand if the bill is not paid within fifteen days. The court clarified that the expression "to which section 166 applies" in Clause (g) merely describes the nature of the demand and does not necessitate the presentation of a bill or a demand notice. The court concluded that the word "demand" in Clause (g) refers to the amount of arrears and does not import the requirement of a formal demand notice. Conclusion: The court held that the appellant was disqualified for being chosen as a member of the Municipal Board on the day he filed his nomination due to arrears in municipal tax exceeding one year's demand. The appeal was dismissed with costs in favor of respondent 3, who contested the appeal. The judgment emphasized that disqualification under Clause (g) attaches at the time of nomination and that the requirements of Sections 166 and 168 do not negate the disqualification if the arrears existed at the time of nomination.
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