9911796707
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Issues Involved:
1. Legislative Competence and Jurisdiction 2. Authority of the Director vs. Officer on Special Duty 3. Validity of the Memorandum Issued by the Officer on Special Duty 4. Time Limit for Disposal of Quarry Lease Applications Issue-wise Detailed Analysis: 1. Legislative Competence and Jurisdiction: The regulation of mines and minerals falls under Entry 54 of List-I of the Constitution, leading to the enactment of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957. Section 2 of the Act declares Union control over the regulation of mines and development of minerals. The Supreme Court's decision in Baijnath v. State of Bihar (1970) affirmed that once Parliament declares control over a subject, any state legislation in that field becomes unconstitutional. This principle is supported by earlier decisions in Hingir-Rampur Coal Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa (1961) and State of Orissa v. M.A. Tulloch & Co. (1964). 2. Authority of the Director vs. Officer on Special Duty: Section 15 of the Act allows State Governments to make rules for regulating minor minerals. The Andhra Pradesh Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1966, specifically empower the Director to grant quarry leases for granite. Rule 12(5) details the Director's authority and procedures for granting leases, emphasizing that the Director alone is competent to grant leases. No provision exists for any Special Officer to override the Director's authority, as affirmed by Rule 11(2). 3. Validity of the Memorandum Issued by the Officer on Special Duty: The appellant challenged the Memorandum issued by the Officer on Special Duty, which directed the Director not to grant quarry leases until a policy decision was made. The court found that the Officer on Special Duty lacked statutory authority to issue such a directive, as the legislative framework and rules only recognize the Director's authority in this matter. The Memorandum was thus declared invalid and not in accordance with the law. 4. Time Limit for Disposal of Quarry Lease Applications: The court disagreed with the single Judge's interpretation that Rule 12(5) does not impose a time limit for the Director to consider applications. The court emphasized that public authorities must act within a reasonable time frame, even if the statute is silent on specific time limits. The reference to a sixty-day period for executing lease deeds in Rule 12(5)(c) indicates legislative intent for timely action. The court rejected the notion that applications could be indefinitely pending awaiting new policies, which had not yet been finalized. Conclusion: The court set aside the single Judge's order and quashed the Memorandum issued by the Officer on Special Duty. The appeal was allowed, and the respondents were directed to dispose of all pending applications within eight weeks. The court underscored the necessity for public authorities to act expeditiously and within the bounds of their statutory authority.
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